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Abstract 
We construct estimates of the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being for France for 
the years 1989 and 2000. We also estimate the standard measure of disposable cash income (DI) 
from the same data sources. We analyze overall trends in the level and distribution of household 
well-being using both measures for France as a whole and for subgroups of the French 
population. The average French household experienced a slower rate of growth in LIMEW than 
DI over the period. A substantial portion of the growth in well-being for the middle quintile was 
a result of increases in net government expenditures and income from wealth. We also found 
that the well-being of families headed by single females relative to married couples deteriorated 
much more, while the well-being of households headed by the elderly relative to households 
headed by the nonelderly improved much more than indicated by the standard measure of 
disposable income. The conventional measure indicates that a steep decline in economic 
inequality took place between 1989 and 2000, while our measure indicates no such change. We 
argue that these outcomes can be traced to the difference in the treatment of the role of wealth in 
shaping economic inequality. Our measure also indicates that, on balance, government 
expenditures and taxes did not have an inequality-reducing effect in France for both years. This 
is, again, contrary to conventional wisdom. 
 
Keywords: Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-being (LIMEW); France; Economic 
Well-Being; Economic Inequality; Household Income Measures 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper describes the construction of the Levy Institute Measure of Economic Well-Being 
(LIMEW) for France. We will also analyze the level and distribution of economic well-being 
using the LIMEW, as well as the conventional measures. This is particularly interesting because 
the LIMEW is a more comprehensive measure of households’ command over resources than the 
conventional measures of disposable income. LIMEW includes estimates of public consumption 
and household production, components that are excluded in most available measures of 
economic well-being. It also includes estimates of long-run benefits from the ownership of 
wealth (other than homes) in the form of an imputed lifetime annuity, a procedure that, in our 
view, is superior to considering only current income from assets. 
No single survey on households provides the information required to construct the 
LIMEW. As a result, our approach was to use the Enquéte Budget de Famille (BDF) as the basic 
sample and supplement it with data from a variety of sources.
1 An overview of the estimation 
process is provided in Table 1. The details are discussed in the subsequent sections and the 
appendices. 
 
2  COMPONENTS OF LIMEW 
 
The LIMEW is constructed as the sum of the following components (see Table 1): base money 
income (line 10); income from wealth (lines 12 through 17); net government expenditures (both 
cash and noncash transfers and public consumption, net of taxes, lines 18 through 24); and 
household production (line 26).  
Base money income is defined as gross money income (MI) less the sum of property 
income (interest, dividends, and rents) and government cash transfers (e.g., basic state pension). 
The rationale for deducting these two items at this stage is to avoid double-counting because we 
do include our own estimates of government transfers and income from wealth (as discussed 
below). Earnings make up the overwhelming portion of base money income. The remainder 
consists of occupational pensions and other small items. 
                                                           
1 The data files used in the study are described in detail later in the paper.   3
The second component is imputed income from the household’s wealth holdings. MI 
includes property income, the sum of interest, dividends, and rent. From our perspective, this is 
an incomplete measure of the economic well-being derived from the ownership of assets. 
Owner-occupied housing yields services to their owners over many years, thereby freeing up 
resources otherwise spent on housing. Financial assets can, under normal conditions, be a source 
of economic security in addition to property-type income.  
In measuring the economic well-being from wealth holdings, it is useful to distinguish 
between owner-occupied homes and other forms of wealth (Wolff and Zacharias 2009). 
Housing is a universal need and homeownership frees the owner from the obligation of paying 
rent, leaving an equivalent amount of resources for consumption and asset accumulation. Hence, 
benefits from owner-occupied housing are reckoned in terms of the replacement cost of the 
services derived from it (i.e., a rental equivalent).
2 We estimate the benefits from nonhome 
assets (real estate excluding homes, liquid assets, and financial assets) using a lifetime annuity 
method.
3 We calculate an annuity based on a given amount of wealth, an interest rate, and life 
expectancy. The annuity is the same for the remaining life of the wealth holder and the terminal 
wealth is assumed to be zero (in the case of households with multiple adults, we use the 
maximum of the life expectancy of the head of household and spouse in the annuity formula). 
Moreover, in our method, we account for differences in portfolio composition across 
households. Instead of using a single interest rate for all assets, we use a weighted average of 
asset-specific and historic real rates of return,
4 where the weights are the proportions of the 
different assets in a household’s total nonhome assets. The burden of liabilities is also captured 
by an analogous procedure that annuitizes the value of debt, with the rate of inflation playing the 
role of the interest rate in the procedure. 
The third component is net government expenditures—the difference between 
government expenditures incurred on behalf of households and taxes paid by households (Wolff 
                                                           
2 This is consistent with the approach adopted in the US national accounts. 
3 This method gives a better indication of resource availability on a sustainable basis over the expected lifetime than 
the standard bond-coupon method. The latter simply applies a uniform interest rate to the value of nonhome wealth. 
It thereby assumes away differences in overall rates of return for individual households ascribable to differences in 
household portfolios. It also assumes that the amount of wealth remains unchanged over the expected (conditional) 
lifetime of the wealth holder. 
4 The rate of return used in our procedure is real total return (the sum of the change in capital value and income 
from the asset, adjusted for inflation). For example, for stocks, the total real return would be the inflation-adjusted 
sum of the change in stock prices plus dividend yields. 
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and Zacharias 2007). Our approach to determine expenditures and taxes is based on the social-
accounting approach (Hicks 1946; Lakin 2002: 43-6). Government expenditures included in the 
LIMEW are cash transfers, noncash transfers, and public consumption. Government cash 
transfers are treated as part of the money income of the recipients. In the case of government 
noncash transfers, our approach is to distribute the appropriate actual cost incurred by the 
government among recipients of the benefit.
5 A potential alternative method of valuation is the 
so-called fungible-value method that is based on the argument that the income value for the 
recipient of a given noncash transfer is, on average, less than the actual cost incurred by the 
government in providing that benefit (see, for example, Canberra Group 2001: 24, 65). This 
valuation method involves estimating how much the household could have paid for the medical 
benefit, after meeting its expenditures on basic items such as food and clothing, with the 
maximum payment for the medical benefit set equal to the average cost incurred by the 
government. 
We do not use the fungible-value approach because of its implication that recipients with 
income below the minimum threshold receive no benefit from the service (like healthcare). This 
implication is inconsistent with our goal of measuring the household’s access to or command 
over products. Further, unlike the social-accounting method, the fungible-value method would 
not yield the actual total government expenditure when aggregated across recipients. Such a 
feature is incompatible with our goal of estimating net government expenditures using a 
consistent methodology. 
The other type of government expenditure that we include in the LIMEW is public 
consumption. We begin with a detailed functional classification of government expenditures. 
We then exclude certain items because they fail to satisfy the general criterion of increasing the 
household’s access to goods or services. These items generally form part of the social overhead 
(e.g., national defense) and do not lend themselves to a market substitute. Other expenditures, 
such as transportation, are allocated only in part to households because part of the expenditure is 
also incurred on behalf of the business sector. The household sector’s share in such expenditures 
can be estimated on the basis of information regarding its utilization (for example, miles driven 
                                                           
5 In the case of medical benefits, the relevant cost is the “insurance value” differentiated by risk classes. 
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by households and businesses). The remaining expenditures (such as health) are allocated fully 
to households. 
In the second stage, the expenditures for each functional category are distributed among 
households. The distribution procedures followed by us build on earlier studies employing the 
government-cost approach (e.g., Ruggles and Higgins 1981; Wolff and Zacharias 2007). Some 
expenditures, such as education, highways, and water and sewerage, are distributed on the basis 
of estimated patterns of utilization or consumption, while others such as public health, fire, and 
police are distributed equally among the relevant population. 
The third part of net government expenditures is taxes. Our objective is to determine the 
actual tax payments made by households, consistent with the government-cost approach. In 
general, therefore, we do not consider tax incidence in our analysis. Taxes consist of personal 
income taxes, property taxes, payroll taxes (employee portion), and consumption taxes. Taxes 
on corporate profits, on business-owned property, and on other businesses, as well as nontax 
payments, are not allocated to the household sector because they are paid directly by the 
business sector. 
The fourth component of LIMEW is the imputed value of household production. Three 
broad categories of unpaid activities are included in the definition of household production: (1) 
core production activities, such as cooking and cleaning; (2) procurement activities, such as 
shopping for groceries and for clothing; and (3) care activities, such as caring for babies and 
reading to children. These activities are considered as “production,” since they can be assigned, 
generally, to third parties apart from the person who performs them, although third parties are 
not always a perfect substitute for the person, especially for the third activity.  
Our strategy for imputing the value of household production is to value the amount of 
time spent by individuals on the basis of its replacement cost as indicated by the average 
earnings of domestic servants or household employees (Kuznets, Epstein, and Jenks 1941: 432-
433; Landefeld and McCulla 2000). Research suggests that there are significant differences 
among households in the quality and composition of the “outputs” of household production, as 
well as the efficiency of housework (National Research Council 2005: ch. 3). The differentials 
are correlated with household-level characteristics (such as wealth) and characteristics of 
household members (such as the influence of parental education on childrearing practices). 
Therefore, we modify the replacement-cost procedure and apply to the average replacement cost 
a discount or premium that depends on how the individual (whose time is being valued) ranks in   6
terms of a performance index. Ideally, the performance index should account for all the factors 
relevant in determining differentials in household production and the weights of the factors 
should be derived from a full-fledged multivariate analysis. Given the absence of such research 
findings, we incorporated three key factors that affect efficiency and quality differentials—
household income, educational attainment, and time availability—with equal weights attached 
to each. 
 
3  ESTIMATING LIMEW 
 
The estimation procedure consists of two main steps. In the first step, a core synthetic microdata 
file is created that contains the various sources of money income, various components of 
household wealth, and time spent on household production activities. This step involves the 
statistical matching of an income and demographic survey with a wealth survey and a time use 
survey. In the next step, information from a variety of sources (administrative data, national 
accounts, etc.) are utilized, in conjunction with the variables contained in the income survey to 
create estimates of government transfers, taxes, public consumption, and household production. 
 
3.1  Statistical Matching 
The surveys are combined to create the core synthetic file using constrained statistical matching. 
The basic idea behind the technique is to transfer information from one survey (the “donor file”) 
to another (the “recipient file”). Such information is not contained in the recipient file but is 
necessary for research purposes. Each individual record in the recipient file is matched with a 
record in the donor file, where a match represents a similar record, based on several common 
variables in both files. The variables are hierarchically organized to create matching cells for the 
matching procedure. Some of these variables are used as strata variables, i.e., categorical 
variables that we consider to be of the greatest importance in designing the match and which we 
therefore use to restrict the records that can be matched between the two files. For example, if 
we use sex and employment status as strata variables, this would mean that we would match 
only individuals of the same sex and employment status. Within the strata, we use a number of 
common variables of secondary importance as match variables. 
The matching is performed on the basis of the estimated propensity scores derived from 
the strata and match variables. For every recipient in the recipient file, an observation in the   7
donor file is matched with the same or nearest neighbor values of propensity scores. In this 
match, a penalty weight is assigned to the distance function according to the size and ranking of 
the coefficients of strata variables. The quality of match is evaluated by comparing the marginal 
and joint distributions of the variable of interest in the donor file and the statistically matched 
file (Kum and Masterson 2010). 
 
3.1.1  Matching Wealth Surveys 
The matching unit for the wealth match (and the unit of analysis for the LIMEW) is the 
household. The basic sample for the 1989 and 2000 LIMEW estimates are the public-use files 
for 1989–1990 and 2000–01 rounds of the Enquête Budget de Famille (BDF), produced by the 
Institute National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques’ (INSEE). The BDF files have 
records for 9,038 and 10,305 households, respectively, in 1989 and 2000. The source data for 
household wealth are the 1992 Enquête sur les Actifs Financiers (EAF) for 1989 and the 2003-
2004 Enquête Patrimoine (PAT) for 2000. The public-use version of the files contained, 
respectively, 9,530 and 9,692 households in 1989 and 2000.  
Several of the income and wealth variables in the wealth surveys were processed before 
matching to convert categorical variables into continuous values. In these cases, we replaced 
those above the median category with a random draw from a Pareto distribution within the 
record’s category range and those below the median category with a random draw from a 
uniform distribution. Some of the key variables of interest to us also had missing values in the 
wealth surveys.
6 We dealt with this problem by using the method of multiple imputation with 
chained equations. This resulted in creating five replicates for each original household record. 
In order to perform a successful match, the candidate data sets must be well-aligned in 
the strata variables used in the match procedure. For the wealth match, strata variables are 
homeownership, age of the household head, educational achievement of the household head, 
family type and household income. Since the recipient and donor files are representative 
samples and not too far apart in time, we can expect them to be well-aligned. This expectation 
was borne out for most of the key demographic variables used in our matching procedure. A 
more significant problem was the inadequate alignment of household income in the surveys. For 
                                                           
6  Variables with missing values were: home ownership, dwelling type, household income class, home value, and 
most of the asset value variables.   8
the 1989 match, we found that the lower and higher ends of the income distribution made up a 
smaller proportion of the wealth sample (EAF) than in the sample of the income and 
demographic survey (BDF). The opposite pattern was prevalent for the 2000 match because the 
the upper and lower income categories are over-represented in the PAT, while the middle 
income categories are under-represented, with respect to the BDF (see appendix A for details). 
Overall, the quality of the matches was good. It has its limitations, especially in terms of 
the income categories (due, once again, to the mismatch of the income variables in the two 
surveys that we noted above). But the overall distribution is transferred with remarkable 
accuracy, and the distributions within even small subgroups are transferred with good precision 
(see appendix A for details). 
 
3.1.2  Matching Time Use Surveys 
The source data for time spent on household production activities was the 1985 and 1999 rounds 
of the Enquête Emploi du Temps (EDT) also carried out by INSEE. While for the wealth match 
the matching unit is the household, for the time use match we use individuals. We use individual 
records from the public-use files for both surveys, excluding those living in group quarters or in 
the armed forces. Since the EDT covers individuals 15 years old and above, we discard younger 
individuals from the BDF file. After the exclusions, the number of individuals in the time-use 
surveys for 1985 and 1999 were, respectively 16,047 and 15,446. The 1999 EDT had missing 
values for household income, which we replaced by the method of multiple imputation with hot-
decking. The records from the time use surveys were matched to 19,293 BDF individual records 
in 1989 and 20,664 in 2005.  
For the time use match, the strata variables are sex, parental status, employment status, 
marital status, and spouse’s employment status. The alignment between the two sources of data 
(i.e., BDF and time use survey) was generally very good in both years, except some 
misalignment for marital status in 1989 (the proportion of married individuals was higher in the 
BDF) and for parental status in 2000 (the proportion of parents was smaller in the BDF). Just as 
we found in the case of matches with wealth data, the quality of the matches with time use data 
was good. And, in a similar vein, some limitations also should be noted, especially in terms of 
the marital and parental status categories due to the data misalignment problems noted above. 
However, even in these cases, the actual deviations between the matched and original data were 
quite small in terms of summary measures. The overall distribution is carried over from the   9
donor to the recipient file with a great deal of accuracy, and the distributions within even small 
subgroups, such as female parent employees, are transferred fairly precisely (see appendix B for 
details). 
 
3.2  Income from Wealth 
We divide net worth into five classes of assets and two types of liabilities. The asset classes are 
primary residence, other real estate net of debt and business equity, liquid assets, financial 
assets, and retirement assets. The first asset is represented by the gross value of owner-occupied 
housing. The second component consists mainly of equity in real estate (other than the principal 
residence), equity in businesses, and nonfinancial assets (excluding consumer durables). Liquid 
assets comprise mainly of cash and demand deposits; time and savings deposits; and, retirement 
demand-saving accounts. Financial assets are made up principally of government bonds, 
corporate bonds, foreign bonds, other financial securities, corporate stock and mutual funds. 
Information on defined-benefit retirement assets was available only in the 1992 wealth survey; 
we include it in our wealth calculations for 1989. However, because they were a small part of 
net worth in 1992 (under 3 percent) it is unlikely that their omission in the later year would 
render any notable bias to our estimates. Liabilities consist of: (a) mortgage debt (including 
equity loans and lines of credit) on owner-occupied housing; and, (b) all other debt such as auto 
and credit card loans (exclusive of mortgages on other property, which are subtracted from the 
value of that property in the second asset class).  
  Income from wealth is divided into two components, which are estimated using different 
methods. The income from home wealth component is calculated by taking the share of imputed 
rent (from the national accounts)
7 proportional to the household’s share of national holdings of 
primary residential housing and subtracting the annuitized value of mortgages on the primary 
residence. We calculated the income from nonhome wealth component by annuitizing the 
household’s nonhome asset holdings with separate rates of return for each asset type and 
subtracting the annuitized value of other debt. The total real rate of return of every other wealth 
component is the average of annual rates over a relatively long period of time, varying from 42 
                                                           
7 The amount of imputed rent for 1989 and 2000 were, respectively, €54.2 and €102.3 billion. These amounts were 
found in the series “Imputed rentals for housing (COICOP)” published by Eurostat and available online at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database. Accessed on November 24, 2010. We 
are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the estimates.   10
to 47 years, depending on the asset (see Table 2 for details). The total rates of return data we use 
are inclusive of both the capital gains and the income generated by the assets. The average rates 
of return by asset type were estimated mostly from the data on asset holdings and interest rates 
published by La banque de France, unless otherwise noted.
8 The annual nominal rates of return 
were also used to adjust for the discrepancy between the years of the wealth surveys and BDF. 





























In which p is income from wealth, m is imputed rent, d is mortgage debt, a is annuity, M is 
aggregate imputed rent, h is gross value of home, H is aggregate value of homes, w is nonhome 
net worth component, r is rate of return, and t is remaining years of life. The data for the 
remaining years of life were derived from Espérance de vie par age et region tables published 
by the INSEE for 1989 and 2000.
9 
As noted above (section 3.1.1), the 1989 BDF was matched to the 1992 wealth survey. 
The amounts of wealth reported in the survey was “deflated” to 1989 levels, using the nominal 
rates of return for the intervening years. A similar procedure was also carried out for the match 
between the 2000 BDF and 2004 wealth survey. The annuity calculations described above were 
carried out after making the adjustments. 
Table 3 shows the average values for the major assets and debts, as well as the estimated 
income from each (values are in 2000 PPP dollars).
10 Looking at the stocks first, we can see that 
                                                           
8 See the notes to Table 2. We are grateful to Georges Menahem for providing some of the information required for 
these estimates. 
9 We are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the data. 
10 All monetary values in this report are in 2000 PPP dollars. We converted the nominal amounts in 1989 to Euros 
using the commonly used rate of 6.56 francs per euro. The nominal euro amounts were then converted into “real” 
2000 amounts with the aid of the implicit deflator for actual individual consumption (inflation factor of 1.201). 
Values for both years were converted into 2000 PPP dollars using the PPP for actual individual consumption (at the 
rate of 0.8846 Euros per dollar).   11
average net worth rose by 41 percent as assets grew and debts declined. Nonhome assets 
increased significantly faster than homes, resulting in a fall in the latter’s share in total assets 
from 53 to 48 percent between 1989 and 2000. The coverage of financial assets is much more 
detailed in the 2004 survey as compared to the 1994 survey. An unknown part of the portfolio 
shift could be due to this factor. Income from wealth also rose, albeit at a much faster rate of 63 
percent. Turning to flows, we can see that income from wealth also rose, albeit at a much faster 
rate than net worth (63 versus 41 percent). Reflecting the change in the composition of stocks, 
the split between income from home and nonhome wealth also underwent a change over the 
period as the share of the latter rose from 50 to 55 percent between 1989 and 2000. 
 
3.3  Government Transfers 
Government transfers are categorized into cash benefits and in-kind benefits. The BDF contains 
household-level data on amount of cash transfers and individual-level data on program 
participation. We group the available cash transfer categories according to the eligibility rules of 
the programs.
11 We align weighted sums for cash transfer items with national accounts from The 
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), which has been developed by OECD in order to 
provide internationally comparable statistics on public and mandatory and voluntary private 
social expenditure at program level.
12 The SOCX covers 33 OECD countries and Estonia for the 
period 1980-2007 including France.
13  
Total cash transfers per household went up by 21 percent from $8,595 to $10,383 
between 1989 and 2000 (Table 4). Old-age cash benefits made up over a half of total cash 
transfers in 1989 and about 58 percent in 2000, reflecting their relatively faster growth of 34 
                                                           
11The level of detail available in the BDF regarding cash transfers improved considerably between 1989 and 2000. 
In 1989, we have only three variables to measure cash transfers: The first cash transfer variable contains transfer 
amounts of unemployment and early retirement benefit programs. The second cash transfer variable contains 
transfer amounts associated with old age programs including retirement pensions, supplementary fund, minimum 
old age assistance to elderly, veteran’s pension, and victim of war disablement pension. The third variable 
summarizes all other cash transfer programs including family allowances, maternity and parental leave, incapacity 
and sickness benefits, housing benefits, and other social assistance. In 2000, we have 24 variables to measure cash 
benefits which we grouped into seven categories including old age benefits, survivors’ benefits, incapacity and 
sickness benefits, family allowances, maternity and parental leave, unemployment benefits and housing benefits.   
12 Our alignment procedure is simply to scale up the totals in the microdata to the benchmark aggregates. No 
attempt was made to account for under-reporting or mis-reporting. 
13 The OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) contains disaggregated data for each program. Using the disaggregated 
data, we exclude lump sum benefits, specific benefits to government employees, grants and subsidies to employers. 
Also we do not include expenditures for temporary jobs for unemployed and youth in our alignment as these 
transfers will likely be reported as salary income in BDF data and including them would result double counting.   12
percent. On the other hand, the second largest cash benefits program, viz., unemployment 
compensation, saw a decline in its share of total cash transfers (13 to 10 percent), because it 
actually declined by roughly 6 percent between 1989 and 2000. Expenditures on active labor 
market programs constitute a relatively small part of cash transfers and its share in total cash 
transfers remained stable at 3 percent between the two years.
14  
Other cash transfers including survivors’ benefits, incapacity and sickness benefits, 
family allowances, maternity and parental leave, and housing expenditures are bundled into one 
variable in BDF 1989. As a result, we aligned the total value of this variable in the BDF to the 
combined expenditures for these transfer items in the SOCX for 1989. BDF 2000, on the other 
hand, do have separate variables for each of these transfer items and expenditures for these 
transfer items were aligned separately. Other cash transfers increased in tandem with overall 
cash transfers over the period and constituted roughly 30 percent of all government cash 
transfers in both years. 
In-kind benefits include residential care for old age and disabled, daycare services for 
families with children, and health expenditures for the whole population. Health care is the 
second largest transfer program after old-age cash benefits with the cost of $4,742 per 
household in 2000, up from $4,107 in 1989, a 16 percent increase. However, health care 
expenditures grew at a slightly slower pace than the rest of government transfers, as its share in 
government transfers reduced from 31 to 30 percent. We assigned health expenditures to 
individuals in the BDF using risk classes defined by sex and age. Our estimates of average costs 
are based on the estimated share of each risk class in total healthcare expenditures. The latter 
were obtained from the estimates for 1992 and 1997 developed by the IRDES (Institut de 
recherche en économie de la santé).
15 The average cost to the government in each risk class is 
assigned to each individual in the risk class. The total health expenditures for the household are 
scaled in such a manner so that when aggregated across all households, the resulting sum will be 
identical to the total health expenditures in SOCX data. 
                                                           
14 Active labor market programs include job training, youth measures, and measures for disabled. While active 
labor programs are listed as cash transfers in SOCX, corresponding variables for amounts received in BDF are not 
available. As a result, we distribute the total expenditures equally to individuals who are recipients of these 
programs, i.e. those who seek for a job, participate in job training programs, unemployed youth and working age 
disabled. 
15 We are grateful to Georges Menahem for providing us with the estimates of average costs of health service by 
risk class (details are available at: http://www.irdes.fr/Publications/Rapports2001/rap1345.pdf). Age categories for 
risk groups are those below 2, between age 2 and 9, between age 10 and 19, ten year intervals until age 80, and 80 
and above.   13
In-kind benefits other than health care constituted only about 4 percent of overall 
spending on transfers and 10 percent of total in-kind benefits. We distributed each of these 
transfer items on an equal per capita basis to the beneficiaries of relevant cash benefits. The 
beneficiaries of old-age noncash expenditures were assumed to be recipients of old age cash 
expenditures. These benefits include residential care and other benefits that target the old age 
population. The average noncash expenditures on old-age declined sharply between 1989 and 
2000 by 61 percent. The beneficiaries of expenditures on the disabled are assumed to be 
recipients of incapacity and sickness benefits. Just as for old-age noncash benefits, in-kind 
benefits for the disabled include residential care and other services. Analogous to the noncash 
expenditures for the elderly, noncash expenditures on the disabled also declined, though at a 
lower extent of 38 percent between 1989 and 2000. Finally, the beneficiaries of expenditures on 
families (for daycare and other services) are assumed to be recipients of family noncash 
benefits. Unlike other categories of noncash benefits, those for families increased dramatically 
(from a low base of $75 in 1989) by nearly six-fold. 
Total government transfers per household went up by 20 percent from $13,175 to 
$15,798 between 1989 and 2000. The proportions of cash and noncash transfers remained fairly 
stable, with cash benefits accounting for roughly two-thirds and in-kind benefits for about one-
third of total transfers. 
  
3.4  Taxes 
We take payroll taxes (employee portion), income taxes, property taxes (on immovable 
property), and consumption taxes into our accounting of economic well-being. 
We used the information provided by the OECD on the French payroll tax system and 
the annual earnings reported by individuals in the BDF to estimate the employee-portion of 
payroll taxes.
16 The tax parameters are shown in Table 5. Payroll taxes are usually deducted at 
source from paychecks or cash benefits. We first calculate the taxable income and then simulate 
the payroll tax burden of each individual in the BDF using the tax parameters for each year. The 
parameters are those applicable to non-managers. Managers have a different contribution 
scheme for retirement. Similarly, the contribution scheme for the self-employed is also different 
                                                           
16 Annual earnings reported in BDF are net of payroll taxes. We use the tax parameters in order to calculate gross 
earnings as well as payroll taxes.    14
from non-managers. However, because information on the separate schemes for managers and 
self-employed were not available in our source data, we used the available scheme (i.e., for non-
managers) for both these groups. The first 19,099 Euros of annual earnings was taxed at a 17.99 
percent and the amount between 19,099 and 57,297 Euros was taxed at a 10.89 percent in 1989. 
Earnings between 57,297 and 76,396 Euros were taxes at 8.97 percent and any earnings above 
76,396 were taxed at 6 percent, indicating the regressive nature of payroll taxes. Both rates and 
allowances went up dramatically in 2000. The first 26,892 Euros of annual earnings was taxes at 
21.20 percent while amount between 26,893 and 80,676 Euros was taxed at 17.05 percent in 
2000. Consecutively, earnings between 80,676 and 107,568 Euros were taxes at 12.05 percent 
and any earnings above 107,568 were taxed at 8.45 percent, indicating that payroll taxes became 
a larger source of tax revenues for France.  
Income taxes were derived from the information reported by the respondents in the 
BDF.
17 In 1989, the amount of last payment and the number of installments paid were reported 
by the respondents. We multiplied the amount of last payment and the number of installments 
paid to obtain the total amount of income taxes paid by the household over the year. In 2000, 
only the amount of last payment was reported. The lack of information about the number of 
installments does not affect the amount of income taxes included in the LIMEW because we 
align income taxes to an annual benchmark amount from the national accounts (see below). 
Income taxes and payroll taxes in the BDF were aligned to their respective 
macroeconomic benchmarks in 1989. However, in 2000, we aligned the combined total of 
income and payroll taxes to its macroeconomic benchmark. Our source for the macroeconomic 
benchmarks was the OECD Revenue Statistics, Comparative Tables.
18 The reason behind 
combining the income and payroll taxes was that two types of taxes, CSG (Contribution Sociale 
Généralisée) and CRDS (Contribution au Remboursement de la Dette Socialewere), were 
present only in 2000. In the Comparative Tables, these taxes are categorized as income taxes 
and there is no separate total available for them. However, the marginal payroll tax rates that we 
used for our estimation in the BDF are inclusive of the contributions to the CSG and CRDS. 
                                                           
17 In contrast, the income tax amounts in the U.S. LIMEW files are those imputed by the Census Bureau using a tax 
model. 
18 The data is available online at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx, under: Public Sector, Taxation and Market 
Regulation > Taxation> Revenue Statistics> Comparative tables> National currency, millions. Accessed on May 
18, 2011. The relevant series are: for income taxes, “Taxes on income, profits and capital gains—
individuals”(series 1100); and, for payroll taxes, they are the sum of “Social security contributions—
individuals”(series 2100) and “Social security contributions—self-employed”(series 2300).   15
Furthermore, the income tax amount reported by the respondents in the BDF cannot be 
separated into the CSG/CRDS portion and the rest. In 2000, the combined total of payroll and 
income taxes in the BDF was 78 percent of their macroeconomic benchmark, while in 1989 it 
was 73 percent.  
Property taxes paid on the main residence are reported by the respondents in the BDF. 
We aligned the total in the BDF with the total taxes paid by households on immovable property. 
The latter was obtained from the OECD Revenue Statistics, Comparative Tables.
19 In 2000, 
aggregate property taxes in the BDF were 84 percent of their macroeconomic benchmark, while 
in 1989 it was 42 percent. 
The alignment of payroll, income and property taxes in the BDF with their respective 
macroeconomic aggregates was accomplished by distributing the discrepancy between the BDF 
and the macroeconomic aggregates according to the proportion of the BDF aggregate accounted 
for by each tax unit. 
Consumption taxes consist of value-added taxes and other (excise etc.) taxes. We 
estimated value-added taxes on the basis of expenditures of various types (food, medicines etc.) 
reported by the respondents in the BDF and statutory tax rates.
20 The tax rates used in the 
calculations are shown in Table 6, Panel A. The rates were based on the method employed in 
Forgeot and Starzec (2003). In addition to the value-added tax, there are a number of other 
indirect taxes on consumption items, especially gasoline, alcohol and tobacco. For these taxes 
we applied the ratios of other indirect taxes to the TVA by household disposable income decile 
as indicated in Table 6 (Panel B) below. We did not align consumption taxes with any 
independent benchmark because such a benchmark was not available. 
Table 7 presents our estimates of taxes using the BDF data and the benchmarks from the 
OECD. On the average, total taxes increased by 42 percent (after adjusting for inflation) from 
1989 to reach a level of approximately $13,000 (in 2000 PPP $) in 2000. The structure of taxes 
remained roughly constant over the period, with income and payroll taxes accounting for nearly 
60 percent of total taxes and consumption taxes making up about 35 percent. The remainder 
consisted of property taxes.  
                                                           
19 The data is available online at: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx, under: Public Sector, Taxation and Market 
Regulation > Taxation> Revenue Statistics> Comparative tables> National currency, millions. Accessed on May 
18, 2011. The relevant series is “Recurrent taxes on immovable property—Households” (series 4110). 
20 Denote   as the consumption expenditure and  as the tax rate. The amount of tax,  , is calculated as:    
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3.5  Public Consumption 
Our valuation of public consumption is based on the government cost method which equates the 
amount of income associated with a given public consumption expenditure to the average 
expenditure that the government incurs for the beneficiary. Estimates of public consumption 
were constructed in three steps: (1) obtaining total expenditures by function, subfunction, and 
sub-subfunction
21; (2) allocating total expenditures between the household sector and other 
sectors of the economy; and (3) distributing expenditures allocated to the household sector 
among individual households. 
  The expenditure definition that we employed for France is the same as that for the U.S., 
viz., consumption expenditures and gross investment of general government. However, 
estimates based on this definition were not readily available by function and subfunction for 
France, forcing us to make some assumptions. Our starting point was the General Government 
Accounts compiled as part of the National Accounts by the OECD.
22 We calculated, for 1989 
and 2000, total (i.e., across all functions) consumption expenditures and gross investment of 
general government as the sum of employee compensation (GD1P), intermediate consumption 
(GKIR), gross capital formation (GP5P), and consumption of fixed capital (GP2P) (the series 
identifiers in the OECD database are shown in parentheses). Ideally, we would have liked a 
breakdown of these expenditures by function and subfunction for both years; but, unfortunately 
such data were not available. Our method of getting around this problem differed across the 
years. 
  To obtain the 2000 estimates, we calculated the sum of employee compensation (DICG), 
intermediate consumption (P2CG), and gross capital formation (P5CG) for ten separate 
functions (the transaction identifiers in the OECD database are shown in parentheses).
23 
Estimates of consumption of fixed capital were not available by function in the database. 
Therefore, we assumed that aggregate consumption of fixed capital (i.e., total across all 
                                                           
21 For the United States, this step also involved obtaining expenditure by the level of government (federal vs. state 
and local) and the distribution of state and local expenditures by state, function and subfunction. A comparable 
procedure could not be carried out for France because of the unavailability of data. However, we did take into some 
amount of regional disparities in the distribution of education expenditures, as discussed later. 
22 The data are available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE11 (table titled “Main 
aggregates of general government,” Dataset 12.) 
23 The data are available at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=SNA_TABLE11 (table titled 
“Government expenditures by function,” Dataset 11.)   17
functions) was distributed across functions in the same manner as the sum of employee 
compensation, intermediate consumption and gross capital formation.
24 This assumption 
allowed us to obtain the functional breakdown of government consumption expenditures and 
gross investment. 
  As mentioned above, the aggregate amount of government consumption expenditures 
and gross investment for 1989 were calculated from the OECD database. However, functional 
breakdown of aggregate expenditure were not available for 1989 in the database. Therefore, we 
estimated the functional breakdown from the National Accounts for France published by the 
United Nations Statistics Division.
25 However, it should be noted that the functional breakdown 
published by the U.N. was of government consumption expenditures. In effect, we assumed that 
the functional breakdown of government consumption expenditures and gross investment in 
1989 was the same as that of government consumption expenditures. 
  For estimating public consumption in a manner comparable to the United States, we 
needed a finer breakdown of some of the expenditures according to their purpose. We needed to 
ascertain the expenditures on fire protection and police services—subfunctions of the function 
“Public order and safety”. The expenditures on transportation, agriculture, environment, 
communication, and energy—subfunctions of the function “Economic Affairs”—had to be 
estimated separately. Furthermore, within the subfunction of transportation, separate 
expenditures for road, air, rail and public transit (sub-subfunctions of transportation) were 
needed. All the amounts required for the detailed subfunctions and sub-subfunctions were 
estimated from the state budgets of the respective years.
26 The only exceptions were the 
expenditures on rail and public transit, which were obtained from the 2000 edition of Comptes 
des Transports.
27 
We also needed separate estimates for expenditures on education by level—subfunctions 
of the function “Education”. We calculated the shares of first, second and third levels of 
education in total education expenditures from the 1989 and 2000 editions of Repères et 
                                                           
24 Aggregate consumption of fixed capital was under 10 percent of total government consumption expenditures and 
gross investment in 2000. 
25 The data can be downloaded interactively from: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp. 
26 We are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the estimates from the French budget. The budget 
documents are available at: http://www.budget.gouv.fr 
27 We did not use the budget for rail and public transit because the only expenditures to be included for them were 
capital expenditures, given that they are considered as “enterprise functions” rather than functions of general 
government. (For “enterprise functions” only capital expenditures are included in the expenditures of general 
government.) The budgets did report capital expenditures for these functions separately.   18
Références Statistique.
28 These shares were then used to divide the aggregate education 
expenditure we obtained from the UN and OECD data among the three levels of education. 
Once we determined the expenditures by function, we proceeded to allocate the 
expenditures between the household sector and other sectors.
29 The methodology followed here 
was similar to that of employed for the United States (Wolff and Zacharias 2007). Two types of 
assumptions are made here. The first concerns the designation of government expenditures 
incurred for a particular purpose as not expanding the consumption possibilities of the 
household sector at all or expand the consumption possibilities of only the household sector. We 
assumed that the expenditures on general public service, defense, and “other public order and 
safety “(for example, courts, prisons, etc.) do not expand the amenities available to the 
households. On the other hand, the expenditures for certain other purposes, such as education, 
were assumed to be incurred solely on behalf of households. 
Intermediate cases are those expenditures that provide services that potentially serve 
both households and other economic actors (such as businesses or government agencies). The 
second set of assumptions was made to deal with them. We allocated a portion of these 
expenditures to the household sector on the basis of assumptions regarding the sector’s “cost-
responsibility.” For example, in the case of expenditures on roads, we assumed that the 
household sector’s share was equal to the share of passenger vehicles in total vehicle miles 
travelled by all (passenger and non-passenger) vehicles.  
The estimates of the functional breakdown of government consumption expenditures and 
gross investment resulting from the procedure described above are shown in Table 8. Overall, 
about $170 billion out of a total of $303 billion government consumption and gross investment 
expenditures were allocated to the household sector in 2000. In our parlance, aggregate public 
consumption is the amount allocated to the household sector. As a percentage of total 
expenditures, aggregate public consumption was stable at around 55 percent in 1989 and 2000. 
Average public consumption (i.e., public consumption per household) grew by 13 percent from 
1989 to reach a level of roughly $6,200 in 2000. The distribution of public consumption across 
the major functions remained fairly constant between the two years (last two columns of Table 
8). As in most industrialized countries, education accounts for the lion’s share in France (around 
                                                           
28 We are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the estimates. 
29 We are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the estimates used in allocating expenditures between the 
household and other sectors.   19
60 percent in 2000). This is followed by housing and community services (about 14 percent), 
economic affairs (about 11 percent), recreation, culture and religion (about 10 percent), and 
public order and safety (about 5 percent). 
The final step in estimating public consumption consists of distributing the expenditures 
allocated to the household sector among individual households. We attempted to follow the 
same principles of direct usage and cost responsibility that were employed in splitting total 
government expenditures between the household and non-household sector. Continuing with the 
example of roads, we distributed the expenditures allocated to the household sector according to 
the vehicle miles driven by households. Because the BDF do not include all the information 
required to make judgments regarding the usage of public services, a number of assumptions 
had to be made in distributing public consumption among individual households. 
The full set of assumptions made regarding the allocation and distribution of public 
expenditures are presented in Table 9. Sources of data used in deriving the assumptions are also 
presented in the notes to the Table. 
 
3.6  Valuation of Household Production 
As discussed in section 2, we include three broad categories of unpaid activities in the definition 
of household production: (1) core production activities; (2) procurement activities; and (3) care 
activities (care of household members). After matching the time use surveys to the BDF in the 
two benchmark years, we calculate the “performance index”, an average of normalized years of 
education, household income, and time available for each person. We multiply this index by the 
minimum wage in each benchmark year and use the greater of that result and the minimum 
wage as the effective wage for household production.
 30 We then multiply the effective wage by 
the hours of household production to produce the value of household production for each person 
in the household, and then add up the total for each household.  
Table 10 shows the per-household values of hours and value of household production. 
The average value of household production declined among the French households between 
                                                           
30 The minimum hourly gross wage was $6.13 and $7.25, respectively, in 1989 and 2000 (in 2000 PPP $). We 
departed from the U.S. methodology of using the average wage for domestic workers in our calculations because 
the French labor force survey data provides only (net) monthly wages of domestic workers. No information was 
available on hours worked. This information was deemed to be inadequate to calculate a reliable hourly 
replacement cost measure.  
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1989 and 2000 by 3.5 percent. It appears that this was solely due to the sharp decline of 15 
percent in the hours spent annually on household production. As shown in the final line of the 
table, the implicit unit value of household production (value of household production per 
household by divided by hours of household production per household) actually increased over 
the period by nearly 14 percent, reflecting the growth in the hourly replacement wage. 
 
 
4  RESULTS 
 
We now compare LIMEW with the standard measures of economic well-being used in most 
academic and official studies: disposable income (DI), that is, gross money income minus 
income and the employee-portion of payroll taxes (see e.g. Council for Employment, Income 
and Social Cohesion, 2006; OECD 2008).
31 This measure could be constructed in a 
straightforward fashion as a byproduct of the estimation of LIMEW (see Table 1). However, 
unlike in LIMEW, the income and payroll taxes were not aligned to their corresponding national 
accounts aggregates in our estimate of disposable. This is consistent with the standard practice. 
Base money income—the amount of income left after deducting government cash 
transfers and property income from gross money income—is identical in LIMEW and DI. It 
consists mostly of income from employment. Government cash transfers are also included in 
both measures, though the amounts in DI are not aligned to their corresponding national 
accounts aggregates. As discussed before, LIMEW includes imputed income from the 
household’s wealth holdings whereas DI includes current property income. Another important 
difference between the two measures stems from the fact that the LIMEW includes imputed 
values of noncash transfers (most importantly, health), public consumption, and household 
production. The definition of household tax burden is also broader in LIMEW as it includes 
consumption and property taxes. As we would expect, these differences between the two 
measures matter substantially for the picture of economic well-being in France during the 
1990s. We now turn to compare and contrast the findings based on the alternative measures and 
explore the proximate sources of their divergence or convergence.  
                                                           
31 All the results reported here exclude households with negative DI. We decided to drop these households from the 
analysis because the 1989 BDF file contains some records with what appears to be abnormally large values for 
income tax payments. The percentage of households with negative DI was 3.1 in 1989 and 0.1 in 2000.   21
 
4.1  Overall Population 
We start by comparing LIMEW and DI for the overall population (Table 11). As we noted 
before, all monetary magnitudes are expressed in 2000 PPP dollars. The median value of 
LIMEW for all households was $45,641 in 1989 and increased to $52,382 in 2000, an increase 
of nearly 15 percent. Not surprisingly, the median value of DI was much lower at $21,113 in 
1989 and $25,229 in 2000, indicating a faster rate of increase than LIMEW at about 20 percent. 
The median values adjusted by the current, conventional OECD equivalence scale (square root 
of household size) are shown in Panel B of the table. They also indicate the same pattern: DI 
values were much lower in both years and the rate of growth was higher for DI. A comparison 
between the standard measure of overall economic growth, per capita GDP, and measures of 
personal economic well-being is shown in Panel C of the table. The estimates suggest that the 
latter grew conspicuously faster than GDP over the period. It is also notable that the average per 
capita value of LIMEW was higher than per capita GDP in 2000. This is probably a reflection of 
the inclusion of the value of household production in the LIMEW and its omission in the GDP. 
Growth in household economic well-being was accompanied by a modest increase (about 100 
hours) in the median annual hours of market work (employment) performed by households 
(Panel D). However, the median values of hours spent on household production and total work 
(market plus housework) declined over the period by 334 and 663 hours, respectively. 
The composition of LIMEW and DI for the overall population is shown in Table 12. 
Panel A presents mean values of each component. Just as we observed for the median values, 
the mean values of DI for both years were substantially below that of LIMEW (less than half). 
This is reflected in the much lower share of base money income in LIMEW compared to DI 
(Panel B). Among the other components, income from wealth in DI (consisting of current 
property income) was only about 15 percent of its counterpart in LIMEW (imputed rent and 
annuitized value of nonhome wealth). As shown in Panel B, the percentage share of this 
component in the overall measure was also a great deal higher in LIMEW than in DI. 
Furthermore, while the relative weight of income from wealth remained roughly stable in DI 
(around 5 percent), its weight in LIMEW increased notably from 12 to 17 percent from 1989 to 
2000. Net government expenditures—expenditures incurred for the households less taxes paid 
by households—were much larger in absolute size in LIMEW than in DI because expenditures 
on public services and noncash benefits outstripped consumption and property tax payments.   22
However, the discrepancy in the percentage share of net government expenditures in the 
measures was considerably smaller than the discrepancy in the share of income from wealth. 
The share of net government expenditures in LIMEW remained constant at 13 percent in 
LIMEW, while it declined from 11 to 10 percent between 1989 and 2000 in DI. As shown in the 
table, the value of household production made up a sizeable portion of LIMEW, although its 
share in LIMEW declined from 34 percent in 1989 to 28 percent in 2000, reflecting the sharp 
drop in the annual hours spent on household production by household. 
The estimates presented in Panel C provide an accounting breakdown of the growth in 
DI and LIMEW between 1989 and 2000 among its constituent components. The average values 
of LIMEW and DI in 2000 were, respectively, 17 and 21 percent higher than in 1989. Given the 
fairly large size of base money income in the measures, it is not surprising to find that it 
accounted for 90 percent of the growth in DI and 54 percent of the growth in LIMEW. Income 
from wealth contributed 45 percent of the growth in LIMEW but only 10 percent of the growth 
in DI. The much greater role of income from wealth as a driver of growth in LIMEW than in DI 
is consistent with what we observed earlier regarding the divergence in the share of income 
from wealth in the two measures. The percentage-point contribution of net government 
expenditures to growth was nearly zero. Consistent with our finding of a fall in the share and 
value of household production in LIMEW, this component subtracted 0.7 percentage points 
from the overall growth in LIMEW. In sum, therefore, it appears that the major difference 
between the two measures consists of the relative contributions to growth made by income from 
wealth and base money income. The latter was the principal driver of growth in DI with former 
playing a small, supporting role; in contrast, in the LIMEW, they both play major, though 
unequal, roles. 
 
4.2  “Middle-Class” Economic Well-Being 
We now turn to a closer look at the third quintile of the LIMEW distribution and compare it to 
its counterpart in the DI distribution. The change in the mean value of the third quintile’s well-
being is a reasonable approximation of the change in the overall median well-being that we 
discussed earlier. Unlike the latter, the former can be decomposed exactly into its constituent 
parts and such a breakdown can offer some insights about the factors affecting the well-being of 
the average household (e.g. improved labor market conditions that might be reflected in higher 
earnings as distinct from increase in government expenditures on public services that might be   23
reflected in higher net government expenditures).The middle quintile is often defined as the 
“middle class,” and we follow that convention here.
32  
Similar to our finding for the whole population, the average value of DI was only under 
50 percent of LIMEW for the middle quintile (Table 13, Panel A). The difference in size is 
responsible for the much lower share of base money income in LIMEW compared to DI (Panel 
B). Turning to the other components, we found that income from wealth in DI amounted to only 
about 10 percent of its counterpart in LIMEW in 1989 and 14 percent in 2000—an outcome that 
is parallel to what was found for the overall population. In relative terms too, the share of 
income from wealth in DI is much lower than in LIMEW for the middle quintile, as it was for 
the overall population (Table 13, Panel B). However, the increase in the share of income from 
wealth in LIMEW between 1989 and 2000 that we observed for the population appears to have 
bypassed the middle quintile because the share of income from wealth in its average LIMEW 
showed only very little change.  
The discrepancy between the two measures in the absolute size of net government 
expenditures for the middle quintile was much smaller than it was for the overall population, 
though the amount in LIMEW was still higher than in DI by about 41 to 43 percent (depending 
on the year). Thus, our finding that, for the overall population, expenditures on public services 
and noncash benefits surpassed consumption and property tax payments also held true for the 
middle class. As a share of overall economic well-being, net government expenditures were 
larger for the middle class than for the overall population. The discrepancy between the overall 
population and middle class was particularly notable for the DI measure. This is because cash 
transfers accounted for a much larger proportion of the DI of the middle class than it did for the 
overall population (40 versus 33 percent in 2000) while taxes took a smaller bite out of middle 
class DI than for the overall population (19 versus 23 percent in 2000). No such difference 
between the middle class and the overall population was observed in the LIMEW distribution as 
net government expenditures constituted a similar percentage of LIMEW (13 to 17 percent) in 
both instances. As shown in the table (Panel B), the value of household production made up a 
considerable portion of LIMEW, although its share in LIMEW declined from 35 to 32 percent 
                                                           
32 In general, the household’s rank in the distribution will not be the same across the two measures and hence the 
households classified as middle class will not be the same across the measures.   24
between 1989 and 2000 as a result of the decrease in the hours spent on household production 
by household. 
Our estimates showed that the average values of LIMEW and DI for their respective 
middle quintiles in 2000 were, respectively, 15 and 20 percent higher than in 1989 (Panel C). 
These growth rates are practically identical to what was observed earlier for the change in the 
median values for the overall population. Base money income accounted for 78 percent of the 
growth in DI and 62 percent of the growth in LIMEW, proportions that are not too different 
from what we observed for the overall population. A key difference between the overall 
population and middle quintile can be found in the contribution of income from wealth to the 
growth in LIMEW. For the overall population, income from wealth contributed 45 percent of 
the growth while for the middle quintile it was only 23 percent. For DI middle quintile, we 
observe that income from wealth contributed similarly around 10 percent of the growth in DI for 
the overall population as well as for the middle quintile.  
The percentage-point contribution of net government expenditures to growth was quite 
small in the two measures and somewhat larger (especially in the case of DI) than we found for 
the overall population. The finding regarding household production offers a contrast. For the 
overall population, we found that this component subtracted 0.7 percentage points from the 
overall growth in LIMEW while for the middle quintile it added 1.0 percentage points. All told, 
the LIMEW suggests that income from wealth played a much greater role than indicated by DI 
and net government expenditures played a much smaller role than indicated by DI in promoting 
middle class well-being over the period. 
  
4.3  Subgroup Disparities 
We next turn to examine disparities among households divided into distinct subgroups based on 
selected characteristics of the head of the household (“reference person”). The selected 
characteristics are far from exhaustive and our purpose here is to focus on those that are most 
frequently employed in understanding subgroup disparities. In each instance, we contrast the 
findings based on LIMEW and DI.    25
4.3.1  Differences by Marital Status 
We first consider disparities between families
33differentiated by marital status of the reference 
person. The estimates of the mean values of LIMEW, its components and DI are shown in Table 
14. Supplementary information is provided in Figure 1. 
In 1989, families headed by a single female had an average LIMEW that was 82 percent 
of the average LIMEW for married couple families; the corresponding statistic for families 
headed by a single male was much lower at 70 percent (Panel B). The relative economic well-
being of single-female headed families fell sharply to 70 percent (a fall of 12 percentage points) 
in 2000; the single-males also suffered the same fate, though their extent of deterioration 
relative to married couples was quite modest at only 1 percentage point. According to the DI 
measure, the single females and single males had average values that were, respectively, 75 and 
83 percent of the married couples. The estimates of DI for 2000 showed deterioration for single 
females as their relative DI slipped by 11 percentage points; single males registered a somewhat 
smaller loss of 1 percentage point in their relative DI. 
We now take a closer look at the proximate factors behind the worsening gap in LIMEW 
between married couples and single females. The four major components of LIMEW are base 
income (consisting mainly of labor earnings), income from wealth, net government expenditures 
and household production (see Panel C and Figure 1). In 1989, the gap in base income between 
the two groups slightly was below the gap in LIMEW. However, in 2000, the gap in base 
income was only under two-thirds (65 percent) of the difference in LIMEW. To a large extent, 
this is a reflection of the relatively low labor income of single females and the fact that the 
married couple households have higher number of earners. On average, single females received 
only slightly less than 60 percent of the average base income of married couples. The gap in 
income from wealth was also favored of married couples and the share of this component in the 
total difference in LIMEW increased notably from 21 to 37 percent between 1989 and 2000. In 
fact, single females suffered an absolute decline (roughly $600) in their average income from 
wealth, which, as a percentage of married couples’ income from wealth, sank from 68 to 35 
percent between 1989 and 2000. As one would expect, the average value of household 
production was higher for married couples than single females; but, the gap between the two 
                                                           
33 We exclude households with only one person and households with only unrelated individuals from the definition 
of “family”.   26
groups in household production did not widen as much as the gap in LIMEW. As a result, the 
share of household production in the difference in LIMEW between the groups declined from 
51 to 34 percent between 1989 and 2000.  
Net government expenditure is the only major component of LIMEW for which single 
females had a higher average than married couples and, therefore, helped to shrink the shortfall 
in the other components faced by single females. Unfortunately, the extent of contribution made 
by net government expenditures toward this end declined between 1989 and 2000. This is 
reflected in the decline in the share of the component in the total difference in LIMEW between 
the two groups from -71 percent to -36 percent. The main factor behind this was the shift of 
transfers in favor of married couples: from helping to narrow the gap faced by single females by 
6 percent in 1989, it actually contributed to widen the gap by 13 percent in 2000. Underlying 
this shift was an absolute decline in the amount of transfers (about $830) received by single 
females. In sum, the estimates suggests that the deterioration in the relative economic well-being 
of single females between 1989 and 2000 was driven mainly by their growing disadvantage in 
income from wealth and the unfavorable shift in government transfers. 
4.3.2  Differences by Age Group 
We next examine the differences in economic well-being of household headed by persons 65 
years and older (“elderly”) and household headed by persons less than 65 years old 
(“nonelderly”). The estimates of the mean values of LIMEW, its components and DI are shown 
in Table 15. Supplementary information is provided in Figure 2. 
In 1989, the average LIMEW of the elderly was 73 percent of the average LIMEW of 
the nonelderly; in 2000, the corresponding statistic was 89 percent (Panel A). A dramatic 
improvement occurred during the 1990s in the relative economic well-being of the elderly as 
measured by the LIMEW. The DI measure also indicates improvement over the period, though 
the extent of improvement was smaller than in LIMEW. The average DI of the elderly rose from 
67 percent of the nonelderly in 1989 to 72 percent in 2000. Thus, the elderly-nonelderly gap 
shrank by 16 percentage points according to LIMEW and only 5 percentage points according to 
DI. 
Among the four major components of LIMEW, the biggest gap was in base income 
(consisting mainly of labor earnings). This is quite understandable in light of the very low level 
of labor market participation among the elderly. The gap in base income between the two   27
groups exceeded the gap in LIMEW in both years by a large margin (see Panel B and Figure 2). 
However, the share of base income in the difference in LIMEW between the groups was much 
higher in 2000 than 1989, reflecting both the larger gap in base and the smaller gap in LIMEW 
in 2000. Due to the higher average number of children and adults among the nonelderly, the 
average value of hours spent on household production and the value of household production 
were also higher for them than the elderly. In contrast to base income, the lead of the nonelderly 
in household production was lower in 2000 than 1989 as their lead in average annual hours 
declined. Income from wealth was much higher, on the average, for the elderly in both years as 
a result of their higher average wealth holdings as well as their lower life expectancy which 
tends to increase the annuitized value of nonhome wealth. As a share of the gap in LIMEW, the 
gap in income from wealth was only 23 percent in 1989 but 109 percent in 2000. This is partly a 
reflection of the widening gap in income from wealth between the two groups: the ratio of 
average income from wealth of the elderly to the nonelderly was 1.64 and 1.83 in 1989 and 
2000, respectively. 
Net government expenditure was skewed in favor of the elderly even more so than 
income from wealth and the disparity became wider during the 1990s. On the average, the 
elderly received a little below four dollars for every dollar received by the nonelderly in 1989; 
but, they received nearly eight dollars in 2000. The growing gap was also reflected in the 
substantial increase in the share of the gap in net government expenditure in the difference in 
LIMEW between the two groups from 67 to 298 percent between 1989 and 2000. Government 
transfers became increasingly skewed in favor of the elderly and served as the main factor 
behind the substantial rise in net government expenditures for the elderly vis-à-vis the 
nonelderly: the share of the gap in transfers in the gap in LIMEW between the two groups 
increased from 42 to 224 percent between 1989 and 2000.
34 All told, the estimates indicate that 
the improvement in the economic well-being of the elderly relative to the nonelderly between 
1989 and 2000 was mostly a result of expanding government transfers and income from wealth 
that offset a larger chunk of the gap in base income. 
 
                                                           
34 The elderly to nonelderly ratio in average transfers was 1.52 in 1989 and 2.13 in 2000.   28
4.3.3  Differences by Level of Education 
We now focus on the disparities in economic well-being among households headed by persons 
of varying educational attainment. The following levels of education were used in our analysis: 
less than high school graduate; high school graduate; some college-level education; and college 
graduate. To make these categories comparable with the United States, we used the International 
Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) produced by UNESCO. We mapped our usual 
U.S. educational attainment categories (less than a high school diploma, high school graduate, 
some college, college graduate) onto the ISCED for the United States.
35 Then we took the 
corresponding categories in the French ISCED
36 and applied them to the educational attainment 
questions in the 1989 and 2001 BDF surveys for France to produce the educational attainment 
variable. The estimates of the mean values of LIMEW, its components and DI for these 
educational categories are shown in Table 16. Supplementary information is provided in Figure 
3. 
The hierarchy of the mean values of LIMEW and DI among the educational groups as 
one would expect a priori: rising from those with less than high school education to college 
graduates. In 2000, the average LIMEW of those who did not complete high school was only 67 
percent of the average LIMEW of college graduates; the average LIMEW of high school 
graduates and those with some college education were around 78 percent of college graduates 
(Panel B). The average LIMEW of each educational group grew pretty much in tandem with 
one another between 1989 and 2000. According to the DI measure, the disparities among the 
educational groups were larger, with the least educated receiving only 50 percent of the average 
DI of college graduates in 2000, while high school graduates and those with some college 
received, respectively, 66 and 76 percent. Disparities in DI among the educational groups also 
widened between 1989 and 2000, mainly reflecting the worsening gap in base income between 
college graduates and the less educated groups. 
Apart from net government expenditures, the other three major components of 
LIMEW—base income, income from wealth and household production—were skewed in favor 
of the college graduates. For the bottom two educational groups, the shortfall in base income 
                                                           
35 Downloaded from “http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/ISCEDMappings/Documents/North America and 
Western Europe/USA_ISCED_mapping.xls,” on June 24, 2011. 
36 Downloaded from “http://www.uis.unesco.org/Education/ISCEDMappings/Documents/North America and 
Western Europe/France_ISCED_mapping.xls,” on June 24, 2011.   29
was greater than the total gap in LIMEW with respect to college graduates in both years, while 
for those with some college it was 75 and 83 percent of the difference in LIMEW in 1989 and 
2000, respectively (Panel D and Figure 3). The base income of college graduates grew much 
faster than the lesser educated groups over the period with the exception of those with some 
college education. The ratios of the other groups’ average base income to the average base 
income of college graduates fell: From 0.33 to 0.28 for those without a high school degree, from 
0.59 to 0.57 for those with a high school degree, whereas the ratio went up from 0.69 to 0.71 for 
those with some college education (Panel B). Apparently, the severity of the decline was 
inversely related to the level of educational attainment. Income from wealth accounted for a 
much smaller portion of the gap in LIMEW with respect to college graduates, but, the disparity 
in income from wealth was much larger than the disparity in base income. In 2000, the ratio of 
average income from wealth of those without a high school degree to college graduates was 
only 0.53; the other two groups fared only slightly better in this respect, with ratios of 0.54 (high 
school graduates) and 0.57 (those with some college). Household production had a share of 
about 9 to 14 percent of the total difference in LIMEW with respect to college graduates for the 
three less educated groups in 2000, partly reflecting the relatively smaller disparities in this 
component among the groups (Panel D). 
The gaps in base income, income from wealth, and household production faced by the 
three less educated groups with respect to college graduates were offset to some extent by net 
government expenditures. As a share of the total difference in LIMEW with college graduates, 
net government expenditures were rather high at -84 and -73 percent (in 2000), respectively, for 
those without a high school degree and high school graduates; they were considerably smaller 
(-39 percent) for those with some college education (Panel D). Among the four groups, the two 
least educated groups received more in government expenditure than what they paid in taxes, 
those with some college were roughly even, and college graduates paid more in taxes than what 
they received in government expenditures. The average amount of taxes paid by those without a 
high school degree was only 34 percent of the average of college graduates and the averages for 
the other two groups were higher at 57 percent (high school graduates) and 70 percent (those 
with some college) in 2000 (Panel B). 
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4.4  Inequality 
4.4.1  Quintile Shares and Quintile Composition 
We begin with a discussion of the shares of aggregate LIMEW received by each quintile and 
compare the findings to the quintile shares of DI. It should be noted that the quintiles for each 
measure are defined with respect to that measure’s distribution so that, in general, a given 
quintile of LIMEW and DI will consist of different households. Our estimates for 1989 and 
2000 are shown in Table 17. 
The shares received by the quintiles were remarkably similar in 2000 for LIMEW and 
DI. The bottom 20 percent of households in the LIMEW distribution received 7.1 percent of 
total LIMEW in 2000 whereas households in the next quintile received 12.5 percent. The 
middle, fourth, and top quintiles of the LIMEW distribution received respectively, 17.6, 23.6, 
and 39.2 percent. However, in 1989, the quintile shares were quite different between the 
measures for the bottom and top quintiles. The bottom quintile in the DI distribution received a 
share of only 5.2 percent while the same quintile in the LIMEW distribution received a share of 
7 percent that was the same as that the quintiles in both distributions received in 2000. For the 
top quintile, the share was 40.9 percent in the DI distribution and 38.3 percent in the LIMEW 
distribution. Thus, the bottom quintile of the DI distribution gained and the top quintile lost its 
share of aggregate income between 1989 and 2000, while the top quintile gained 1 percent share 
in the LIMEW distribution.  
The composition of LIMEW by quintiles in 1989 and 2000 are shown in Table 18. Base 
income was the largest item in both years for all quintiles. In 2000, it constituted 51 percent for 
the bottom quintile, 43 for the second quintile, 42 percent for the third quintile and 41 percent 
for the next two quintiles. This represented a large increase from 1989 for the bottom two 
quintiles when the share of base income in their LIMEW was 41 and 36 percent, respectively, 
for the bottom and second quintile. The change was in contrast to the top three quintiles where 
the share of base income showed little or no change between two years.  
As a share of LIMEW, income from wealth stayed in the rather narrow range of 10 to 14 
percent across the quintiles in 1989. The situation in 2000 was quite different with the share 
rising substantially for the top quintile by 10 percentage points to reach a level of 24 percent. 
For the bottom quintile, income from wealth grew in tandem with the rest of their LIMEW and 
its share stayed at 10 percent in both years. The share of income from wealth in LIMEW   31
registered only modest gains for the second and third quintiles, while the fourth quintile saw a 3 
percentage point gain from 11 to 14 percent. 
On average, government expenditures for households outweighed household tax 
payments in all quintiles in both years. In 1989 the share of net government expenditures in 
LIMEW was around 14 percent for the whole population and declined to 12 percent in 2000. 
The bottom quintile’s ranking among quintiles in terms of the share of net government 
expenditures in LIMEW was highest in both years. There was a decline of 2 percentage points 
(18 to 16 percent) in the share of net government expenditures for the second quintile between 
1989 and 2000; a similar decline could also be observed for the top quintile (from 11 to 8 
percent). Both the third and fourth quintiles had a share of 14 percent in 2000, which was a one 
percentage point decline for the third quintile and a one percentage point increase for the fourth 
quintile.  
As a share of LIMEW, the value of household production fell precipitously for the 
bottom quintile from 29 percent in 1989 to 20 percent in 2000. This was mainly a reflection of 
33 percent decline in the hours that they spent on household production over the period. As we 
observed before (Table 13), hours of household production declined for the overall population 
between 1989 and 2000. The top four quintiles also displayed the same tendency and as a result 
the share of household production in their LIMEW also declined, although the extent of the 
decline was not as dramatic as for the bottom quintile. In 1989, the share of household 
production for the top four quintiles were in the range of 33 to 35 percent, while in 1989, the 
range was 27 to 32 percent. 
In summary, shares of the bottom two quintiles in aggregate LIMEW remained fairly 
stable, the next two quintiles experienced a slight decline in the shares, and the top quintile 
improved its share between 1989 and 2000. Growth in base income was the principal factor 
driving the growth in well-being for all quintiles. However, its relative weight in accounting for 
growth was higher for the bottom two quintiles, as evident in the notable increase in the share of 
base income in LIMEW. Income from wealth increased much faster than the rest of LIMEW for 
the top quintile and its share in their LIMEW rose substantially. As a share of LIMEW, 
household production fell for all quintiles, mirroring the decline in the hours spent on household 
production between 1989 and 2000.    32
4.4.2  Did Inequality Fall in France over the 1990s? 
Estimates of the Gini coefficient for 1989 and 2000 are shown in Table 19. Overall inequality in 
LIMEW showed little change between the two years. In sharp contrast, the DI measure showed 
a major decline in inequality. The dissimilarity in the change in inequality also holds for the 
subset of households that are family households—households of 2 or more persons in which the 
members are related by blood, marriage/cohabitation or adoption. The divergence between the 
two measures was starker after the standard equivalence scale adjustment (square root of 
household size), with the inequality in LIMEW among all households showing an increase of 
1.7 Gini points and DI showing a decline of 3.3 Gini points.  
For all households, the Gini coefficient for LIMEW and DI were, respectively, 32.3 and 
32.8 in 2000, an increase of 0.6 Gini points for LIMEW but a decrease of 3.1 Gini points for DI 
from 1989. Adjusting the measures by family size lowered the measured level of inequality. The 
decline was larger for LIMEW because the amounts of certain components of LIMEW, e.g., 
public education, health, household production, etc., accruing to individual households are 
directly related to the number of persons in the household. Once household economic well-
being is adjusted for household size, the larger households do not appear to be as well-off as 
before. This is also the main reason for the lower level of inequality when we restrict our 
attention only to family households, which by definition can only include households of 2 or 
more persons. 
To better understand the differences in the level of inequality in LIMEW and DI, we also 
conducted a decomposition analysis. In the decomposition, the Gini coefficient is expressed as 
the weighted sum of the concentration coefficients of each component (e.g., base income) and 
the weights are the income shares:     ∑     
 
     , where G is the Gini coefficient of the 
measure (say LIMEW), k  is the concentration coefficient of an individual component of 
LIMEW (say income from wealth), and s  is the share of the individual component in aggregate 
LIMEW (see, Kakwani 1977). The results of the decomposition are shown in Table 20. 
The level of inequality in DI can be seen as resulting from two counteracting influences: 
the positive and large contribution to inequality stemming from base income (primarily 
consisting of earnings), which exceeded the total amount of inequality in both years, and the 
negative contribution to inequality due to net government expenditures. In contrast, base income 
accounts only for roughly 38 percent of the total inequality in LIMEW in 2000, primarily 
because of the inclusion of household production, which accounts for roughly 28 percent of total   33
inequality in LIMEW. The share of base income in total inequality tends to be lower in LIMEW 
also because income from wealth is reckoned as imputed rent plus annuitized value of nonhome 
wealth in LIMEW rather than as actual property income in DI. Our approach entailed a much 
larger share of income from wealth in total economic well-being as well as in total inequality. 
The overall level of inequality is thus the result of the counteracting influences of the positive 
contributions made by base income, income from wealth, and household production on the one 
hand, and the negative contribution made by net government expenditures on the other. 
The interplay between the components in determining the change in inequality between 
1989 and 2000 are displayed in Figure 4. The contribution of base income to inequality declined 
in both DI and LIMEW, though the extent of the decline was much larger in DI. As indicated by 
the declining concentration coefficients (Table 20), the distribution of base income became less 
unequal across both distributions and this was the main factor behind its lower contribution to 
inequality in 2000 relative to 1989. Contribution made by net government expenditures to 
inequality also declined in both measures, though, just as with base income, the fall was more 
pronounced for DI. The inequality in LIMEW was lowered further from its 1989 level by the 
decline in the contribution made by household production, mirroring mainly the fall in its share 
of LIMEW that we discussed before. The downward pull on inequality in LIMEW exerted by 
base income, net government expenditures and household production were offset almost entirely 
by the notable increase in the contribution made to inequality by income from wealth. In 
contrast, contribution of income from wealth to inequality hardly changed at all in DI. In turn, 
the surge in the contribution of income from wealth to inequality in LIMEW between 1989 and 
2000 was due to the rise in its income share and its more unequal distribution across the rungs 
of LIMEW. The latter is reflected in the sharp increase in its concentration coefficient. It also 
echoes our earlier observation regarding the rising share of income from wealth in the LIMEW 
of the top quintile. A comparison with the DI measure shows that the concentration coefficient 
of income from wealth hardly changed over the period and there was only a meager increase in 
its income share.   
It is worthwhile to examine the role of net government expenditures in the inequality in 
the two measures a little closer because of the usual importance to attached to it as an index of 
the redistributive effect of government social expenditures and taxation. There was a sharp 
contrast between DI and LIMEW in this respect. On balance, net government expenditures had 
an inequality-reducing effect in DI and an inequality-enhancing effect in LIMEW in both 1989   34
and 2000. For instance, in 2000, net government expenditures added 2.2 Gini points to the 
inequality in LIMEW, while it subtracted 8.7 Gini points from the inequality in DI. 
Since the major portion of the inequality reduction associated with net government 
expenditures was due to taxes, particularly direct (income and payroll) taxes, it stands to reason 
that a major part of the difference is attributable to the variation across measures in the 
distributional impact of taxes (see Figure 5). The lower redistributive impact of taxes in LIMEW 
was due to the fact the latter includes household production and, to a lesser extent, imputed rent 
and the annuitized value of nonhome wealth. Both household production and imputed income 
from wealth are, obviously, not subject to taxation. Their inclusion in LIMEW therefore tends to 
lower the concentration coefficient of taxes in LIMEW relative to DI (e.g., the concentration 
coefficient of direct taxes in LIMEW and DI were, respectively, 0.28 and 0.48 in 2000). The 
inclusion also has the effect of lowering the share of taxes in the overall measure (e.g., the share 
of direct taxes in LIMEW and DI were, respectively, -0.14 and -0.23 in 2000). In addition to the 
effect of direct taxes, it also turned out that the inequality-reducing effects of indirect taxes 
(consumption and property taxes) in LIMEW were not large enough to offset the inequality-
enhancing effects of public consumption and noncash transfers. 
 
5  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we constructed and analyzed the level and distribution of economic well-being in 
France for 1989 and 2000, using the LIMEW as well as the standard measure of disposable 
income (DI). The LIMEW is a more comprehensive measure of households’ command over 
resources than DI, which is defined as gross money income less direct taxes paid by the 
households (income taxes and the employee-portion of payroll taxes). Our measure includes a 
broader estimate of government benefits because we went beyond the DI definition of cash 
transfers and incorporated government expenditures on noncash benefits (mainly health), and a 
variety of public services that directly serve the households (e.g. infrastructure, public safety, 
and public education). We also include in our measure, the value of hours spent on household 
production, a component that is excluded in DI. Further, we include estimates of long-run 
benefits from the ownership of wealth (other than homes) in the form of an imputed lifetime 
annuity, a procedure that, in our view, is superior to considering only current income from 
assets. We constructed LIMEW and DI for a representative sample of the French population,   35
and compared and contrasted the measures for the overall population as well as several 
subpopulations and income groups. Our findings, in general, suggest that the alternative 
measures differ considerably regarding the picture they offer regarding the level and distribution 
of well-being in France. 
Between 1989 and 2000, the gain in economic well-being enjoyed by the average French 
household was only 15 percent according to LIMEW, while it was 20 percent according to the 
DI measure. At least part of the explanation for the slower growth in LIMEW lies in the 
difference in size: the median value of DI was less than half of the median value of LIMEW in 
both years. Apart from the differing rates of change, the sources of change in the economic 
well-being of the middle quintile appeared to be quite different across the measures. Income 
from wealth accounted for a substantial portion of the total growth in middle-class LIMEW, 
while most of the growth in the middle quintile of DI was due to the growth in base income 
(consisting mainly of labor income). Net government expenditures contributed more to the 
growth in middle class DI than it did for LIMEW. The LIMEW thus suggests that the 
government played a smaller role in promoting middle-class well-being.  
Several important aspects of disparities among population subgroups were also revealed 
by the LIMEW. The economic well-being of families headed by single females had worsened 
much more than suggested by the standard DI measure. Income from wealth and government 
transfers received by the families headed by single females declined absolutely between 1989 
and 2000. Our measure also revealed that there was much greater improvement in the well-
being of elderly households relative to nonelderly households than indicated by DI. The ratio of 
elderly to nonelderly average LIMEW shrank by 16 percentage points according to LIMEW and 
only 5 percentage points according to the corresponding DI statistic. Expanding government 
transfers and income from wealth that offset a larger chunk of the gap in base income accounted 
for much of the measured improvement in the relative LIMEW of the elderly. Unlike DI, the 
LIMEW did not indicate that the growth in economic well-being of households headed by 
college graduates outstripped the growth experienced by households headed by lesser educated 
individuals. The relatively faster growth of DI for college graduates was mainly a reflection of 
the faster growth of their labor income. However, because LIMEW includes a broader definition 
of government expenditures and household production, the changes in the gaps in these 
components also influence relative economic well-being. As it turned out, the changes in these   36
gaps were favorable to the lesser educated households and those changes helped them to 
overcome the disadvantage stemming from their relatively lower base income.  
The LIMEW offered a starkly different picture from DI regarding the change in 
inequality over the period. In particular, there was practically no change in Gini coefficient for 
LIMEW while that for DI fell steeply by nearly 3 Gini points. It is indeed on the basis of the 
latter measure that France has often been characterized by conventional analyses as a country 
that has experienced declining inequality over the 1990s (see, e.g., OECD 2008: 286). Our 
decomposition analysis revealed that this “stylized fact” is crucially dependent on neglecting the 
role of wealth inequality in shaping economic inequality. By our reckoning, the share of income 
from wealth in overall well-being, especially for those at the top rungs of the LIMEW 
distribution increased sharply over the period. In fact, it was the higher contribution of income 
from wealth to inequality in 2000 compared to 1989 that offset the lower contributions of base 
income and net government expenditures. The difference in the portion of inequality accounted 
for by income from wealth between LIMEW and DI stems from the fact that DI do not 
adequately reflect the advantages from wealth ownership, while LIMEW attempts to account for 
it in the form of an imputed rent and the annuitized value of nonhome wealth. 
Our estimates also indicated that there was a sharp difference between LIMEW and DI 
in terms of the redistributive effect of government social expenditures and taxation. On balance, 
government expenditures and taxes had an inequality-reducing effect in DI and an inequality-
enhancing effect in LIMEW in both 1989 and 2000. The main reason behind the finding is the 
lower redistributive impact of taxes in LIMEW because it includes household production and, to 
a lesser extent, imputed rent and the annuitized value of nonhome wealth. Both household 
production and imputed income from wealth are, obviously, not subject to taxation. In addition 
to the effect of direct taxes, it also turned out that the inequality-reducing effects of indirect 
taxes (consumption and property taxes) in LIMEW were not large enough to offset the 
inequality-enhancing effects of public consumption and noncash transfers. 
Several of the findings reported here deserve further scrutiny, a task that we expect to 
undertake in future work. For example, it would be instructive to examine the trends in France 
in relation to the trends in the U.S. over the same period, a task that we attempt to perform in a 
forthcoming companion paper. An unavoidable part of constructing measures of economic well-
being is that one needs to choose among assumptions that are arguably equally tenable. For 
example, it could be argued that the imputed return on home equity is a better measure of the   37
advantage of homeownership than the imputed rent, our chosen assumption. Indeed, whether 
alternative assumptions would make any substantive difference in terms of the major findings 
regarding the level and distribution of economic well-being can only be ascertained via 
sensitivity analysis. Given the additively decomposable nature of LIMEW, such sensitivity 
analyses are relatively easier to conduct within our framework.   38
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
Table 1: Estimation of LIMEW for France: Overview 
 
Line 
no.  Item  Source 
1  Money income net of payroll taxes 
(employee portion)  BDF 
2  Plus:    
3  Payroll taxes (employee portion)  BDF and tax simulation 
4  Equals:    
5  Gross Money Income (MI)    
6  Less:    
7  Government cash transfers  BDF 
8  Property income  BDF 
9  Equals:    
10  Base money income  BDF 
11  Plus:    
12  Imputed rent on homes  Statistical matching of BDF and 
wealth survey; and, national accounts 
13  Plus:    
14  Annuitized value of nonhome assets  Statistical matching of FRS and 
wealth survey; and, supplementary 
information on life expectancy and 
rates of return 
15  Less: 
16  Annuitized value of debt 
17  Plus:    
18  Government cash and noncash transfers  BDF and OECD SOCEX Database 
19  Public consumption  BDF, national accounts and 
supplementary information 
20  Less:    
21  Income taxes  BDF, OECD Revenue Statistics, 
supplementary information, and tax 
simulation 
22  Payroll taxes (employee portion) 
23  Property taxes 
24  Consumption taxes  BDF and tax simulation 
25  Plus:    
26  Value of household production  Statistical matching of BDF and time-
use survey 
27  Equals:    
28  LIMEW    
 
Key: BDF = Enquête Budget de Famille; SOCEX = Social Expenditure Database. 
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Table 2: Long term rates of return (percent) 
 
   Nominal  Real  Period 
Real estate and business  8.09  3.05  1960-2007 
Liquid assets  4.19  -0.77  1965-2007 
Financial assets  5.02  0.12  1960-2007 
Retirement assets  5.02  0.12  1960-2007 
Mortgage debt  0.00  -4.66  1960-2007 
Other debt  0.00  -4.66  1960-2007 
Inflation rate (CPI-108 
cities) 
4.89     1960-2007 
5.00     1965-2007 
 
Notes:   Real rate of return = (1+Nominal rate)/(1+Inflation rate)-1 
Real estate and business: Calculated as the average of changes in financial net worth of unincorporated 
business (“Entrepreneurs individuelles”). The data for France is available only from 1978. For the earlier 
period, we assumed that the French rate of return was equal to the average over the same period in the US 
rate of return (7.5%, as compared to 8.7% for the French data over the period 1978-2007), calculated from 
the Flow of Funds data published by the Federal Reserve. It should be noted that our preferred measure 
(and the measure used in our U.S. estimates) of rate of return is the ratio of holding gains to equity in 
unincorporated business. However, the required information was not available for France. 
Liquid assets: Weighted average of interest rates on checking and time/saving deposits. Checking 
deposits are assumed to earn no interest. Interest rate on time and saving deposits was calculated as the 
average on a variety of time and saving accounts: Livret A et bleu, Livret d'épargne Populaire, Livret de 
développment durable Codevi, Compte d'épargne logement, Plan dépargne logement, PEL taux hors 
prime d'Eat, time deposits less than 2 years, and time deposits of 2 or more years. No data was available 
on interest rates before 1966. From 1966 onwards, data availability varies across accounts, with some of 
them available throughout the period (e.g. Livret A et bleu), while some others are available only from 
mid-90s (e.g. time deposits of 2 or more years). In order to calculate the average of interest rate on 
checking and time/saving deposits we needed information on the share of each asset in their combined 
total. Information on the aggregate value of checking and time/saving accounts held by the household 
sector is available from 1977 onwards. We assumed that the shares between 1965 and 1977 were equal to 
their 1977 values. Using these shares as weights, we calculated the average interest rate on liquid assets 
for the period 1966 to 2007. We assumed that the average interest rate in 1965 was the same as in 1966.  
Financial assets: Weighted average of rate of return on (1) stocks; (2) French government bonds; and (3) 
mutual fund shares. Weights are based on historical shares of each type of asset in total of all three. The 
value of mutual fund shares was calculated as the sum of Titre OPCVM monétaire (SICAV+ FCP), Titre 
OPCVM Généraux, and Titre de fonds d'investissemnt divers. Because data on asset values were available 
only from 1977, we assumed that the weights during the period 1960-1977 were the same as those in 1977. 
The rate of return on stocks is simply the year-over-year change in the index of stock prices. 
Unfortunately, a consistent index was not available for France for the entire period. For the years from 
1988 onward, the CAC40 index is available but, for the previous years, the index is calculated from the 
sample of 180 shares on the Paris exchange. Because the levels are not comparable across the two indices, 
there was a problem in calculating the percentage change in 1988 over 1987. We approximated this 
change based on change in the series “Value of an investment in stocks, dividends reinvested (€, basis 
2000)”, adjusted by the change in the CPI. (The series is available in “Séries longues 1800-2009” available 
at http://www.cgedd.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=137). The rate of return 
on bonds was assumed to be equal to the yield on 10-year government bonds. Finally, the rate of return on 
mutual funds shares was assumed to be equal to the weighted average of the rates of return on stocks and   41
bonds. The data on stock market index and bond yields were obtained from the International Financial 
Statistics CD-ROM published by the International Monetary Fund. 
Retirement assets: Same as financial assets. Applies only to 1989. 
Debts: Debts are assumed to have a zero nominal rate of “return” and a real rate of “return” that depends 
only on the rate of inflation. 
Inflation rate: Calculated from the CPI (108 Cities). The data on the CPI was taken from the 
International Financial Statistics CD-ROM published by the International Monetary Fund.   42
Table 3: Components of Net Worth and Income from Wealth (average values in 2000 PPP 
dollars), 1989 and 2000 
Flows  Stocks 
Percent change, 
1989-2000 
1989  2000  1989  2000  Flows  Stocks 
Homes  3,716  4,715  69,611  86,934  26.9  24.9 
Real estate and business  1,426  3,293  34,305  52,947  130.9  54.3 
Liquid and financial 
assets
1  1,236  2,281  28,215  41,955  84.6  48.7 
Mortgage debt  160  188  10,025  9,868  17.3  -1.6 
Other debt  27  34  1,738  1,731  24.3  -0.4 
Net worth  6,190  10,067  120,367  170,237  62.6  41.4 
Home equity
2  3,555  4,527  59,586  77,066  27.3  29.3 
Nonhome wealth
3  2,635  5,540  60,782  93,170  110.3  53.3 
 
Notes: (1) This category also includes a small amount of retirement assets in 1989. (2) Value of homes less 
mortgage debt. (3) Sum of nonhome assets minus other debt. 
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Table 4: Government transfers, 1989 and 2000 (all monetary amounts are in 2000 PPP $) 
   Average per household  Share (percent) 
Percent 
change,  
   1989  2000  1989  2000  1989-2000 
Cash transfers  8,595  10,383  65.2  65.7  20.8 
Old age  4,517  6,056  34.3  38.3  34.1 
Unemployment  1,140  1,075  8.7  6.8  -5.7 
Active labor market programs  239  288  1.8  1.8  20.6 
Other
1  2,699  2,964  20.5  18.8  9.8 
Survivors' benefits     704     4.5    
Incapacity and sickness     803     5.1    
Family allowances     669     4.2    
Maternity and parental benefits     223     1.4    
Housing     565     3.6    
Noncash transfers  4,579  5,415  34.8  34.3  18.2 
Old age  69  27  0.5  0.2  -60.8 
Disabled  329  202  2.5  1.3  -38.4 
Family benefits  75  443  0.6  2.8  493.4 
Health  4,107  4,742  31.2  30.0  15.5 
Total Transfers  13,175  15,798  100.0  100.0  19.9 
 
Notes: (1) The components of other cash transfers are not separately identified in 1989. 
Source: Authors’ estimates based on the BDF and OECD SOCX Database. See text for details. 
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Table 5: Payroll tax parameters 
 
YEAR  Marginal 
rate 
(percent) 





1989  17.99  0  19,099 
10.89  19,099  57,297 
8.97  57,297  76,396 
6.00  76,396  n/a 
2000  21.20  0  26,892 
17.05  26,892  80,676 
12.05  80,676  107,568 
8.45  107,568  n/a 
 
Note:  n/a indicates “not applicable” 
Source: OECD Tax Database (www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase), Employee social security contribution 
rates and related provisions (Table III.1), accessed on May 19, 2011. 
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Table 6: Consumption tax parameters 
A.  Value Added Tax Rates by Product Type, 1989 and 2000 
   Value Added Tax Rates (%) 
Products  1989  2000 
Cereals  5.5  5.5 
Vegetables  5.5  5.5 
Fruits  5.5  5.5 
Meat, poultry, fish  5.5  5.5 
Milk, cheese, eggs  5.5  5.5 
Fats  18.6  19.6 
Sugar and other  18.6  19.6 
Wine  18.6  19.6 
Liqueur  18.6  19.6 
Beer  18.6  19.6 
Non-alcoholic drink  5.5  5.5 
Coffee, tea  5.5  5.5 
Products for baby  18.6    
Dietetics products  18.6    
Other alimentary products  18.6  19.6 
Meal outside house   18.6  19.6 
Clothing  18.6  19.6 
Heating  18.6  19.6 
Solid combustible   18.6  19.6 
Wood, coal  18.6    
Electricity  18.6  19.6 
Gas  18.6  19.6 
Butane  18.6    
Piece of furniture  18.6  19.6 
Housing linen  18.6  19.6 
Freezer  18.6  19.6 
Washing machine  18.6    
Other big electric appliance  18.6  19.6 
Electric appliance  18.6  19.6 
Other home article  18.6  19.6 
Do-it-yourself  18.6  19.6 
Cleaning products  18.6  19.6 
House equipment  18.6    
House        
Health  18.6  19.6 
Car  28  19.6 
Motor bike  28  19.6 
Bike     19.6 
Fuel  18.6  19.6 
Other car expenditures  18.6  19.6 
Public means of conveyance  5.5  5.5 
Plane and boat expend  5.5    
Communication  18.6  19.6 
Transport and communication         46
Television, radio  18.6  19.6 
Camera   28  19.6 
Record  18.6  19.6 
Computer     19.6 
Other     19.6 
Sport article  18.6  19.6 
Caravan  18.6    
Boat  18.6    
Amusement  5.5  5.5 
Book  5.5  5.5 
Newspaper  5.5  5.5 
Typewriter  18.6    
Garden equipment  18.6  19.6 
Garden furniture  18.6    
School  18.6  19.6 
Tobacco  28  19.6 
Package tour     19.6 
Animals     19.6 
Other goods and services  18.6  19.6 
 
B.  Other indirect taxes 
Decile  TVA  Other  Ratio 
1  65.8%  34.2%  0.520 
2  65.5%  34.5%  0.527 
3  65.4%  34.6%  0.529 
4  65.3%  34.7%  0.531 
5  65.5%  34.5%  0.527 
6  65.1%  34.9%  0.536 
7  67.0%  33.0%  0.493 
8  67.5%  32.5%  0.481 
9  69.7%  30.3%  0.435 
10  71.7%  28.3%  0.395 
Total  66.9%  33.1%  0.495 
 
Note: The deciles are defined with respect to household disposable money income. 
Source: Authors' calculations based on “Tableau 11 : Structure de la fiscalité indirecte par décile de 
niveau de vie (en %)” in Forgeot and Starzec (2003). 
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Table 7: Taxes by type of tax, 1989 and 2000 (in 2000 PPP dollars) 






1989  2000 
Income and payroll taxes  5,322  7,630  43.4  58.1  58.7 
Income  2,048  22.4 
Payroll  3,274  35.7 
Property  533  821  53.9  5.8  6.3 
Consumption  3,308  4,556  37.7  36.1  35.0 
Total  9,163  13,006  41.9  100.0  100.0 
 
Note: Income and payroll taxes could not be separated in 2000. See text for discussion. 
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Table 8: Government consumption expenditures and gross investment, 1989 and 
2000 (in millions of 2000 PPP $) 













1989  2000  1989  2000  1989  2000  1989  2000 
General public services  40,720  65,699  0  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Defense  51,064  35,445  0  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Public order and safety  14,313  19,892  4,933  5,516  34.5  27.7  3.9  3.3 
Police services  7,125  10,597  3,562  5,299  50.0  50.0  2.8  3.1 
Fire-protection services  2,740  434  1,370  217  50.0  50.0  1.1  0.1 
Other  4,448  8,860  0  0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Economic affairs  19,475  29,599  13,004  19,487  66.8  65.8  10.3  11.5 
Transportation  7,224  12,510  5,053  9,029  69.9  72.2  4.0  5.3 
Road  5,300  7,099  3,710  4,827  70.0  68.0  2.9  2.8 
Water  284  774  284  774  100.0  100.0  0.2  0.5 
Air   1,094  1,806  547  813  50.0  45.0  0.4  0.5 
Rail  101  1,440  67  1,224  66.0  85.0  0.1  0.7 
Public transit  445  1,392  445  1,392  100.0  100.0  0.4  0.8 
Communication  1,013  1,785  1,013  1,785  100.0  100.0  0.8  1.1 
Agriculture  3,271  4,565  2,682  2,374  82.0  52.0  2.1  1.4 
Energy  2,773  3,860  1,137  1,621  41.0  42.0  0.9  1.0 
Other economic affairs  5,194  6,879  3,120  4,678  60.1  68.0  2.5  2.8 
Environment  -  10,662  -  2,666  -  25.0  -  1.6 
Housing and community amenities  19,993  23,736  19,993  23,736  100.0  100.0  15.8  14.0 
Education  79,080  101,774  79,080  101,774  100.0  100.0  62.4  60.0 
First level  24,981  31,407  24,981  31,407  100.0  100.0  19.7  18.5 
Second level  41,055  51,275  41,055  51,275  100.0  100.0  32.4  30.3 
Third level  13,044  19,092  13,044  19,092  100.0  100.0  10.3  11.3 
Recreation, culture and religion  9,807  16,319  9,807  16,319  100.0  100.0  7.7  9.6 
TOTAL  234,452  303,127  126,817  169,497  54.1  55.9  100.0  100.0 
 
Note:  “-“ indicates not available.  
Expenditures on the environment were not reported separately in 1989. According to the classification in 1989, 
such expenditures would have been included under “housing and community services” (e.g., sanitation 
expenditures) and under “economic affairs” (e.g. pollution abatement). We were able to identify a small amount of 
pollution control and abatement expenditures from the 1989 budget documents ($272 million) and have included it 
under “other economic affairs” for that year. 
Source: OECD, UN, and State budgets. See text for details.     49
Table 9: Allocation and distribution assumptions, 1989 and 2000 
   Allocation  Distribution 
General public services  None  N.A. 
Defense  None  N.A. 
Public order and safety       
Police services  50%
1  Population
5 
Fire-protection services  50%
1  Population
5 
Other  None  N.A. 
Economic affairs       
Transportation       
Road 
Share of passenger vehicles in total 
miles travelled
2  
Kilometers driven by household 
income decile
6 
Water  All 




Share of passenger air traffic in total 
air traffic
2 




Share of train traffic for passengers in 
total train traffic
2  
Kilometers travelled by household 
income decile
6 
Public transit  All 
Kilometers travelled by household 
income decile
6 
Communication  All    
Agriculture  Share of family farms in total farms
3  Deciles of farm size
8 
Energy 
Share of household energy 
consumption in total energy 
consumption
4 
Deciles of energy expenditures
8 
Other economic affairs  All 
Half by population and half by 




Share of household sector in total 
pollution (CO2 emission)
4 
Deciles of polluting expenditures
10 
Housing and community amenities  All 
10% by population, 60% by renters 
with income less than the median 
income of renters, 30% by 
polluting expenditures
11 
Education       
First level  All 
Students in public educational 
institutions
12 
Second level  All 
Students in public educational 
institutions
12 
Third level  All 
Students in public educational 
institutions
12 
Recreation, culture and religion  All  Population
5 
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Notes: 
1.  Arbitrary assumption of equal division between the household sector and other sectors; applies also to the 
United States. 
2.  Mémento de statistiques des transports (Handbook of Transport Statistics). Available at: 
http://www.statistiques.equipement.gouv.fr/index.php3 in the section “Transports.” 
3.  Census of Agriculture, 1988 and 2000. 
4.  Available at: http://www.statistiques.equipement.gouv.fr/index.php3 in the section “Énergie.” 
5.  BDF. 
6.  1989: Enquête transport et communication 1994 (INSEE); 2000: Enquête nationale transports et 
déplacements 2008 (SOeS, INRETS and INSEE). The total amount for each decile was divided equally 
among the households designated as users in the decile. A household is considered as a “user” of road 
transportation if they owned an automobile or incurred any expenditure on road transportation. Users of 
rail transportation, air transportation and public transit are identified by whether they reported any 
expenditure on these modes of transportation. (We are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the 
estimates from the surveys.) 
7.  BDF. There were too few households in the sample with expenditures on water transportation. Therefore, 
we used all consumption expenditures. The total amount for each decile was divided equally among the 
households in the decile. 
8.  BDF. The total amount for each decile was divided equally among the households in the decile. 
9.  BDF. Some of these (e.g., regulation of food safety) may benefit all equally and some of these (e.g. 
promotion of particular lines of commerce) may benefit the better-off more. Unfortunately, the French 
data does not allow us to make more detailed breakdown of this function. The total amount for each decile 
was divided equally among the households in the decile. 
10.  BDF. Polluting expenditures were defined as the sum of household expenditures on food and drink, 
alcoholic beverages, clothing, water, energy, transportation, household furnishings, drugs and medical 
supplies, entertainment, personal care products, and tobacco. The total amount for each decile was divided 
equally among the households in the decile. 
11.  BDF. The functions listed under this category include housing development, community development, and 
a host of sanitation services and utilities. Unfortunately, the French data does not allow a more detailed 
function and therefore we were forced to make some arbitrary assumptions. We picked renters in the 
bottom half of the income distribution of renter households. According to Ditch et al. (2001), roughly 50% 
of the renter households in France lived in social housing during the period under study here (primarily 
Habitat à Loyer Modéré – Moderate Rent Habitation). Ditch J., A. Lewis and S. Wilcox (2001), “Social 
housing, tenure and housing: an international review”, Department for work and pensions. In-house report 
83. 
12.  BDF and administrative data. Roughly 15 to 20 percent of students did not attend public educational 
institutions in the years of our study. We utilized administrative data on regionally differentiated (by 
“zones”) enrollment rates by level of education to select students attending public educational institutions 
(Repères et références statistques de l'enseignement 2002). A random selection procedure was carried out 
to ensure that the proportion of students assumed to be attending public educational institutions among all 
individuals in the relevant age group in the BDF would be identical to the enrollment rate obtained from 
the administrative data. Unfortunately, public expenditure data on education disaggregated by region 
(“zone”) was not available. Therefore, we assigned the national per-pupil average to each student assumed 
to be attending a public educational institution. As indicated in the table, separate averages were used for 
each level of education. (We are grateful to Ramzi Hadji for providing us with the estimates of student 
enrollment from the administrative data.)      51
Table 10: Value of household production (in 2000 PPP $) and annual hours of 
household production, 1989 and 2000 (Mean values per household) 
 




Hours  2,237  1,901  -15.0 
Value  17,449  16,845  -3.5 
Implicit unit value  7.8  8.9  13.6 
 
Note: Implicit unit value (in 2000 PPP $) is the value of household production divided by the hours of household 
production. 
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Table 11: Economic Well-Being and Work, 1989–2000 (in 2000 PPP $, except for hours) 
  
   1989  2000 
 1989-2000, 
Percent change 
A. Median values for 
households          
LIMEW               45,641                52,382   14.8 
DI               21,113                25,229   19.5 
B. Median values for 
households adjusted by the 
equivalence scale          
Equivalent LIMEW               29,315                34,127   16.4 
Equivalent DI               10,253                14,787   44.2 
C. Real per capita amounts          
GDP               19,691                21,914   11.3 
LIMEW (mean value)               19,105                24,688   29.2 
DI (mean value)                9,060                12,162   34.2 
D. Median values of annual 
hours of work by 
households          
Market work                2,093                  1,759   -15.9 
Housework                4,121                  3,484   -15.5 
Total work               29,315                34,127   16.4 
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Table 12: Components of Economic Well-Being, 1989 and 2000 
   1989  2000 
   DI  LIMEW  DI  LIMEW 
A. Mean values (in 2000 PPP 
US$)             
Base money income  20,390  20,390  25,025  25,025 
Income from wealth  919  6,191  1,419  10,070 
Cash transfers  7,759  8,615  9,505  10,104 
Income and payroll taxes  -4,976  -6,861  -6,707  -8,572 
Noncash transfers           .  4,827           .  5,705 
Consumption and property 
taxes           .  -5,113           .  -6,071 
Public consumption           .  5,548           .  6,241 
Household production           .  17,195           .  16,835 
Total  24,093  50,794  29,243  59,337 
Addendum:             
Net government expenditures  2,784  7,017  2,798  7,407 
Hours of household production     2,222     1,899 
   1989  2000 
B. Percent share  DI  LIMEW  DI  LIMEW 
Base money income  85  40  86  42 
Income from wealth  4  12  5  17 
Cash transfers  32  17  33  17 
Income and payroll taxes  -21  -14  -23  -14 
Noncash transfers     10     10 
Consumption and property 
taxes     -10     -10 
Public consumption     11     11 
Household production     34     28 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Addendum:             
Net government expenditures  12  14  10  12 
C. Contribution to Growth in LIMEW mean value by component (in percentage points) 
   DI  LIMEW       
Base money income  19.2  9.1       
Income from wealth  2.1  7.6       
Cash transfers  7.2  2.9       
Income and payroll taxes  -7.2  -3.4       
Noncash transfers     1.7       
Consumption and property 
taxes     -1.9       
Public consumption     1.4       
Household production     -0.7       
Total  21.4  16.8       
Addendum:             
Net government expenditures  0.1  0.8       
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Table 13: Components of Economic Well-Being for Middle-Class Households, 1989 and 
2000 
   1989  2000 
   DI  LIMEW  DI  LIMEW 
A. Mean values (in 2000 PPP 
US$)             
Base money income  15,801  17,630  19,059  21,765 
Income from wealth  482  4,939  940  6,488 
Cash transfers  8,675  8,867  10,200  10,262 
Income and payroll taxes  -3,804  -5,998  -4,885  -7,434 
Noncash transfers           .  4,993           .  5,837 
Consumption and property 
taxes           .  -5,121           .  -5,942 
Public consumption           .  4,222           .  4,778 
Household production           .  16,116           .  16,584 
Total  21,154  45,646  25,314  52,339 
Addendum:             
Net government expenditures  4,871  6,962  5,316  7,502 
Hours of household production  2370  2317  2071  2043 
   1989  2000 
B. Percent share  DI  LIMEW  DI  LIMEW 
Base money income  75  39  75  42 
Income from wealth  2  11  4  12 
Cash transfers  41  19  40  20 
Income and payroll taxes  -18  -13  -19  -14 
Noncash transfers     11     11 
Consumption and property 
taxes     -11     -11 
Public consumption     9     9 
Household production     35     32 
Total  100  100  100  100 
Addendum:             
Net government expenditures  23  15  21  14 
C. Contribution to Growth in LIMEW mean value by component (in percentage 
points)    
   DI  LIMEW       
Base money income  15.4  9.1       
Income from wealth  2.2  3.4       
Cash transfers  7.2  3.1       
Income and payroll taxes  -5.1  -3.1       
Noncash transfers     1.8       
Consumption and property 
taxes     -1.8       
Public consumption     1.2       
Household production     1.0       
Total  19.7  14.7       
Addendum:             
Net government expenditures  2.1  1.2       
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Table 14: Disparities by Marital Status, 1989 and 2000 
A. Mean values (2000 PPP US $) 
   1989  2000 











male    
Base Income  25,973  14,840  18,651  32,045  17,974  26,467 
Income from wealth  7,303  4,942  6,092  12,458  4,357  6,799 
Home wealth  4,306  2,792  3,166  5,602  2,456  2,702 
Nonhome wealth  2,997  2,150  2,927  6,856  1,901  4,097 
Net government expenditures  6,861  14,813  7,578  7,055  14,829  5,497 
Transfers  14,997  15,676  13,063  17,748  14,846  15,436 
Public consumption  6,678  7,783  5,531  7,549  9,701  6,761 
Taxes  -14,813  -8,647  -11,015  -18,242  -9,718  -16,700 
Household production  21,616  15,919  11,194  21,831  14,495  11,750 
LIMEW  61,753  50,514  43,516  73,389  51,656  50,514 
Addendum:                   
Disposable income  28,575  21,542  23,783  35,362  22,745  28,875 
Annual hours of household 
production  2,725  2,239  1,504  2,410  1,821  1,326 
             
 
B. Ratios to married couple’s mean values 
   1989  2000 











male    
Base Income  1.00  0.57  0.72  1.00  0.56  0.83 
Income from wealth  1.00  0.68  0.83  1.00  0.35  0.55 
Home wealth  1.00  0.65  0.74  1.00  0.44  0.48 
Nonhome wealth  1.00  0.72  0.98  1.00  0.28  0.60 
Net government expenditures  1.00  2.16  1.10  1.00  2.10  0.78 
Transfers  1.00  1.05  0.87  1.00  0.84  0.87 
Public consumption  1.00  1.17  0.83  1.00  1.29  0.90 
Taxes  1.00  0.58  0.74  1.00  0.53  0.92 
Household production  1.00  0.74  0.52  1.00  0.66  0.54 
LIMEW  1.00  0.82  0.70  1.00  0.70  0.69 
Addendum:                   
Disposable income  1.00  0.75  0.83  1.00  0.64  0.82 
Annual hours of household 
production  1.00  0.82  0.55  1.00  0.76  0.55 
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Table 14 (continued) 
C. Gaps in LIMEW by component, between married couple and single female (married couple minus single 
female)  
  
Amount (in 2000 PPP 
US$)  Percent share 
   1989  2000  1989  2000 
Base Income  11,133  14,071  99  65 
Income from wealth  2,361  8,101  21  37 
Home wealth  1,514  3,147  13  14 
Nonhome wealth  848  4,954  8  23 
Net government 
expenditures  -7,952  -7,775  -71  -36 
Transfers  -680  2,901  -6  13 
Public consumption  -1,106  -2,152  -10  -10 
Taxes  -6,166  -8,524  -55  -39 
Household production  5,697  7,336  51  34 
LIMEW  11,240  21,733  100  100 
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Table 15: Disparities between the Elderly and Nonelderly Households  
 
A. Mean values in 2000 PPP US $ 
   1989  2000  Elderly/ Nonelderly 
   Nonelderly  Elderl
y  Nonelderly  Elderl
y  1989  2000 
Base Income  26,465  2,023  32,990  2,216  0.08  0.07 
Income from wealth  5,343  8,756  8,294  15,157  1.64  1.83 
Home wealth  3,553  3,566  4,245  5,336  1.01  1.26 
Nonhome wealth  1,790  5,190  4,049  9,821  2.86  2.42 
Net government expenditures  4,519  14,570  2,536  21,357  3.65  7.99 
Transfers  11,897  18,114  12,138  26,323  1.52  2.13 
Public consumption  6,808  1,741  7,806  1,762  0.26  0.23 
Taxes  -14,186  -5,285  -17,407  -6,728  0.38  0.39 
Household production  18,189  14,190  17,153  15,923  0.77  0.93 
LIMEW  54,517  39,538  60,973  54,653  0.73  0.89 
Addendum:                   
Disposable income  26,293  17,442  31,519  22,725  0.67  0.72 
Annual hours of household 
production  2,295  1,999  1,947  1,762  0.87  0.90 
             
 
B. Gaps in LIMEW by component, between nonelderly and elderly (nonelderly minus elderly)  
  
Amount (in 2000 PPP 
US$)  Percent share 
   1989  2000  1989  2000 
Base Income  24,442  30,774  163  487 
Income from wealth  -3,412  -6,863  -23  -109 
Home wealth  -13  -1,091  0  -17 
Nonhome wealth  -3,400  -5,773  -23  -91 
Net government 
expenditures  -10,051  -18,820  -67  -298 
Transfers  -6,216  -14,185  -42  -224 
Public consumption  5,066  6,043  34  96 
Taxes  -8,901  -10,679  -59  -169 
Household production  3,999  1,229  27  19 
LIMEW  14,978  6,320  100  100 
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Table 16: Disparities by Level of Education  
A. Mean values in 2000 PPP US $ 















College  College 
Base Income  13,777  25,072  29,259  42,247  13,664  28,335  35,119  49,429 
Income from wealth  5,540  5,859  7,382  11,553  9,022  9,222  9,759  17,030 
Home wealth  3,097  3,704  4,099  5,936  4,231  4,651  4,701  5,144 
Nonhome wealth  2,443  2,154  3,284  5,617  4,791  4,571  5,057  11,886 
Net government 
expenditures  10,444  5,120  799  -4,971  14,410  5,720  -349  -7,128 
Transfers  14,623  12,220  10,622  12,554  18,558  14,013  12,686  13,570 
Public consumption  4,743  6,603  5,795  6,919  5,217  7,352  6,304  6,882 
Taxes  -8,923 
-
13,703  -15,618  -24,445  -9,364 
-
15,645  -19,338  -27,580 
Household production  15,687  18,434  17,387  23,335  15,782  17,498  16,660  19,161 
LIMEW  45,447  54,485  54,826  72,163  52,878  60,776  61,189  78,493 
Addendum:                         
Disposable income  20,401  25,980  29,101  39,475  23,031  30,104  34,561  45,617 
Annual hours of household 
production  2,240  2,281  1,930  2,121  1,908  1,983  1,784  1,732 
                 
 
B. Ratios to the mean values of college graduates 













College  College 
Base Income  0.33  0.59  0.69  1.00  0.28  0.57  0.71  1.00 
Income from wealth  0.48  0.51  0.64  1.00  0.53  0.54  0.57  1.00 
Home wealth  0.52  0.62  0.69  1.00  0.82  0.90  0.91  1.00 
Nonhome wealth  0.43  0.38  0.58  1.00  0.40  0.38  0.43  1.00 
Net government 
expenditures  -2.10  -1.03  -0.16  1.00  -2.02  -0.80  0.05  1.00 
Transfers  1.16  0.97  0.85  1.00  1.37  1.03  0.93  1.00 
Public consumption  0.69  0.95  0.84  1.00  0.76  1.07  0.92  1.00 
Taxes  0.37  0.56  0.64  1.00  0.34  0.57  0.70  1.00 
Household production  0.67  0.79  0.75  1.00  0.82  0.91  0.87  1.00 
LIMEW  0.63  0.76  0.76  1.00  0.67  0.77  0.78  1.00 
Addendum:                         
Disposable income  0.52  0.66  0.74  1.00  0.50  0.66  0.76  1.00 
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Table 16 (continued) 
C. Gaps (in 2000 PPP US $) in LIMEW by component, between college graduates and others (college 
graduates minus other)  














Base Income  28,470  17,174  12,988  35,765  21,094  14,310 
Income from wealth  6,013  5,695  4,171  8,008  7,808  7,271 
Home wealth  2,839  2,232  1,838  914  493  443 
Nonhome wealth  3,174  3,463  2,333  7,095  7,315  6,828 
Net government 
expenditures  -15,415  -10,092  -5,770  -21,538  -12,848  -6,779 
Transfers  -2,069  334  1,932  -4,988  -443  884 
Public consumption  2,176  317  1,125  1,666  -470  579 
Taxes  -15,522  -10,742  -8,827  -18,215  -11,935  -8,242 
Household production  7,648  4,900  5,948  3,379  1,663  2,501 
LIMEW  26,716  17,678  17,337  25,614  17,717  17,304 
 
D. Percentage share of each component in the gap in LIMEW between college graduates and others (college 
graduates minus other)  














Base Income  107  97  75  140  119  83 
Income from wealth  23  32  24  31  44  42 
Home wealth  11  13  11  4  3  3 
Nonhome wealth  12  20  13  28  41  39 
Net government 
expenditures  -58  -57  -33  -84  -73  -39 
Transfers  -8  2  11  -19  -3  5 
Public consumption  8  2  6  7  -3  3 
Taxes  -58  -61  -51  -71  -67  -48 
Household production  29  28  34  13  9  14 
LIMEW  100  100  100  100  100  100 
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Table 17: Quintile Shares in LIMEW and DI, 1989 and 2000  
   Quintile 
A. Shares (percent)  1  2  3  4  5 
1989                
LIMEW  7.0  12.4  18.0  24.3  38.3 
DI  5.2  11.7  17.6  24.6  40.9 
2000                
LIMEW  7.1  12.5  17.6  23.6  39.2 
DI  7.1  12.2  17.3  23.6  39.8 
                 
B. Change in shares (percentage points), 1989 to 
2000  Quintile 
   1  2  3  4  5 
LIMEW  0.1  0.1  -0.3  -0.7  0.9 
DI  1.9  0.4  -0.2  -1.0  -1.1 
 
Note: The quintiles of each measure are defined with respect to itself. 
     61

















   1989    
Bottom  41  10  20  29  100  17,756 
Second  36  11  18  35  100  31,517 
Third  39  11  15  35  100  45,646 
Fourth  41  11  13  34  100  61,722 
Top  41  14  11  33  100  97,288 
All  40  12  14  34  100  50,794 
   2000    
Bottom  51  10  19  20  100  20,949 
Second  43  12  16  29  100  37,092 
Third  42  12  14  32  100  52,339 
Fourth  41  14  14  31  100  70,034 
Top  41  24  8  27  100  116,261 
All  42  17  12  28  100  59,337 
   Change in share (percentage point), 1989 to 2000    
Bottom  10  0  -1  -9  0.0    
Second  7  1  -2  -6  0.0    
Third  3  2  -1  -4  0.0    
Fourth  0  3  1  -4  0.0    
Top  0  10  -3  -7  0.0    
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A. All households          
LIMEW  31.6  32.3  0.6 
DI  35.9  32.8  -3.1 
Equivalent 
LIMEW  23.9  25.7  1.7 
Equivalent DI  32.1  28.8  -3.3 
B. Family 
households          
LIMEW  25.1  25.8  0.7 
DI  31.9  28.4  -3.5 
Equivalent 
LIMEW  21.6  23.4  1.8 
Equivalent DI  31.2  27.6  -3.7   63
Table 20: Decomposition of Inequality by Source and Measure 

















1989 to 2000 
LIMEW                      
Base income  0.330  0.401  0.133  0.294  0.422  0.124  -0.009 
Income from 
wealth  0.389  0.122  0.047  0.501  0.170  0.085  0.038 
Cash transfers  0.203  0.170  0.034  0.171  0.170  0.029  -0.005 
Income and 
payroll taxes  0.305  -0.135  -0.041  0.282  -0.144  -0.041  0.000 
Noncash 
transfers  0.187  0.095  0.018  0.209  0.096  0.020  0.002 
Consumption 
and property 
taxes  0.177  -0.101  -0.018  0.200  -0.102  -0.020  -0.003 
Public 
consumption  0.324  0.109  0.035  0.320  0.105  0.034  -0.002 
Household 
production  0.319  0.339  0.108  0.324  0.284  0.092  -0.016 
Total     1.000  0.316     1.000  0.323  0.006 
Addendum: Net 
government 
expenditures     0.138  0.029     0.125  0.022  -0.007 
DI                      
Base income  0.476  0.846  0.403  0.456  0.856  0.391  -0.012 
Income from 
wealth  0.526  0.038  0.020  0.506  0.049  0.025  0.004 
Cash transfers  0.091  0.322  0.029  0.071  0.325  0.023  -0.006 
Income and 
payroll taxes  0.451  -0.207  -0.093  0.478  -0.229  -0.110  -0.017 
Total     1.000  0.359     1.000  0.328  -0.031 
Addendum: Net 
government 
expenditures     0.116  -0.064     0.096  -0.087  -0.023   64
Figure 1: Share of each component in the total difference in LIMEW between married 
couples and single females (in percent) 
 
Figure 2: Share of each component in the total difference in LIMEW between nonelderly 























































Figure 3: Share of each component in the total difference in LIMEW between college 
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Figure 4: Contribution to the Change in the Gini Coefficient of LIMEW and DI (Gini 
points), 1989 to 2000 
 
Figure 5: Contribution of Government Expenditures and Taxes on the Gini Coefficient of 
LIMEW and DI (Gini points), 2000 
 
 










































APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL MATCHES WITH WEALTH DATA 
This appendix and the next describe the construction of synthetic datasets created for use in 
estimation of the LIMEW for France for the years 1989 and 2000. The process used is 
propensity score statistical matching, which is described in Kum and Masterson (2010). 
A.1 1989  
Data and Alignment 
The matching unit for the wealth match (and the unit of analysis for the LIMEW) is the 
household. The source data sets for the wealth match for the 1989 French LIMEW estimates are 
the 1989-90 BDF and the 1992 EAF. The 1989-90 BDF is used since it has income data for 
1989. The 1989-90 BDF file has records for 24,595 individuals in 9,038 households. These 
records represent 54,658,197 individuals in 21,201,890 French households after weighting. The 
1992 EAF contains 9,530 household records. Many of the wealth and income variables were 
categorical. In these cases, we replaced those above the median category with a random draw 
from a Pareto distribution within the record’s category range. We dealt with the missing values 
in the data with the method of multiple imputation with chained equations.
37 We created five 
implicates for each record for a total of 47,650 records. This translates to 22,145,405 households 
when weighted. In order to perform a successful match, the candidate data sets must be well 
aligned in the strata variables used in the match procedure.
38 For the 1989 French wealth match, 
strata variables are homeownership, age of the household head, educational achievement of the 
household head, family type and household income. Table A.1 compares the distribution of 
households by these five variables in the two data sets. Since both surveys are regionally 
representative samples carried out three years apart, we can expect them to be reasonably well 
aligned.  
The largest differences between the two surveys are in terms of income category, with 
those at the lower and higher ends of the household income distribution making up a smaller 
proportion of the EAF sample than of the BDF, while those in the middle income categories 
make up a larger proportion. These misalignments can make matching a challenge, because it 
ensures that, for example some households with less than 50,000 Francs annual income in the 
                                                           
37 Variables with missing values were: home ownership, dwelling type, household income class, home value, and 
most of the asset value variables. 
38 Statistical matching is done first within subsets of the two data sets defined by key variables, which are referred 
to as strata variables.   68
BDF will be matched with households in the middle income categories in the EAF, thereby 
slightly exaggerating the wealth profile of the lower end of the income distribution 
(corresponding effects can be expected at the upper end of the income distribution). The other 
strata variables are better aligned, with home ownership and family type having one percent or 
less difference between the surveys. The former is especially significant for the wealth match, of 
course, since home ownership constitutes a major proportion of most households’ assets.  
Match QC 
Turning to the results of the match, we first look to the distribution of matched records by 
matching round in Table A.2. Earlier rounds occur in the most detailed cells (Round 1 occurs 
within cells that incorporate all five strata variables). The majority of the matches usually 
happen in the earliest rounds, but generally a much greater percentage than in this case. Only 
92% of the records are matched in the first five rounds. This demonstrates the effect of the 
misalignment noted above. This fact means that although most of the wealth records will be 
assigned to records that are similar in age, education, family type, home ownership and income 
to their donor records, a great many will be mismatched in one or more of these dimensions. In 
all, twenty-two rounds of matching were required to match every donor record. The final round 
includes all those recipient records for which no match could be found. In the latter case, each 
recipient record was assigned the average value from the corresponding subcell in the donor 
data set for each variable. Table A.3 provides a comparison of the distribution of net worth in 
the EAF and the matched file. The p75/p50 and p90/p50 ratios are quite close, but the others are 
not as good. It appears that the bottom tail of the wealth distribution in the matched file is 
somewhat thinner than in the EAF. For example, p10 for net worth in the matched file is 285F, 
while it is 1,304F in the EAF. The Gini coefficient is quite close, 0.681 in the matched file, 
compared to 0.677 in the EAF.  
Examination of the quality of the match within population sub-groups shows generally 
good results. Figure A.1 displays ratios of mean net worth between the matched file and the 
EAF for the five strata variables. With one exception, the ratios of mean net worth within sub-
categories of the five strata variables are all within 10% of unity. The fourth income group 
(from 100,000 to 130,000 Francs in household income) has 15% lower net worth in the matched 
file than in the EAF. Table A.4 has the actual numbers, and we can see that this represents a 
substantial difference of 79,000F. The median net worth for this group in the matched file is   69
18% smaller than that of the EAF, though this difference is less than 63,000F. The second group 
in the homeowner panel of Figure A.1 is homeowners. We can see that they have 3.2% smaller 
net worth in the matched file than in the EAF. We see in Table A.4 that this translates to 
30,000F less average net worth for homeowners in the matched file. The corresponding 
difference in medians is 8,000F. Those households with elderly heads have 6% lower mean net 
worth in the matched file than in the EAF. Consulting Table A.4, we see that this means 
40,000F smaller net worth, while their median net worth is 9.5% lower than in the EAF (a 
39,000F difference). For judging the accuracy of the match in preserving the distribution of 
wealth by sub-groups, Table A.4 displays the ratios of mean and median values for the strata 
variables’ categories. The renter-owner ratios of mean and median values are well-carried over, 
while the ratios for the elder/non-elder ratio are as well. The ratios by household income group 
are surprisingly well reproduced in the match file, considering the misalignment in this variable. 
The rest of the ratios’ values in the EAF are reasonably well represented in the match file. The 
extent to which the match file reproduces the distribution of net worth within matching cells is 
demonstrated in Figure A.2.
39 We can see that, although the tails are attenuated somewhat, the 
distribution is well preserved in the matching process, even at this level of detail. 
Overall, the quality of the match is good. It has its limitations, especially in terms of 
household income. But the overall distribution is transferred with remarkable accuracy, and the 
distribution within even small sub-groups is transferred with good precision. 
A.2 2000 
Data and Alignment 
The source data sets for the wealth match for the 2000 LIMEW estimates for France are the 
2000 BDF and the 2004 PAT. The 2000 BDF is used since it has income and demographic data 
for 2000. The 2000 BDF file contains records for 25,803 individuals in 10,305 households. 
These records represent 59,450,271 individuals in 24,525,505 French households after 
weighting. Missing values have been replaced using the method of multiple imputation with 
chained equations.40 This resulted in five replicates for each original observation for a total of 
129,015 individual records and 51,525 household records. The 2004 PAT contains 9,692 
household records. When the weights are appropriately adjusted, the records in the PAT 
                                                           
39  Household income and educational achievement are excluded for the sake of clarity of the plot. 
40 Variables with missing values were educational attainment and occupational category.   70
represent 24,737,820 households. As for the EAF 1992, many of the asset and income values 
were categorical and so were transformed using the Pareto distribution in the manner described 
above. Again, missing values were replaced using the method of multiple imputation with 
chained equations.41 This process produced five implicates for each original record, resulting in 
a total of 48,460 records. The strata variables for this wealth match are homeownership, age, 
family type, household income and education. Table A.5 shows the distribution of households 
by these five variables in the two data sets. Both surveys are regionally representative samples 
carried four years apart, we can expect them to be reasonably well aligned. 
We see that as with the 1989 wealth match, the distribution of household income is fairly 
poorly aligned. In this case, however, the upper and lower income categories are over-
represented in the PAT, while the middle income categories are under-represented, with respect 
to the BDF. The distribution of the other strata variables is very close in the two surveys, within 
one percent in all cases but family type. In the latter case, married couples are 1.9% more 
prevalent in the BDF than the PAT, while male-headed households are 1.3% less prevalent in 
the PAT. These misalignments carry the cautions mentioned above in terms of what we can 
expect from the match quality along these dimensions, at least.  
Match QC 
The match itself required twenty rounds of matching to complete and was 85 percent done after 
the first round (see Table A.6). This is a good sign, as so many records were matched within one 
of 162 very detailed matching cells (formed by combinations of all five strata variables). After 
five rounds, over 95% of the records were matched. These characteristics of the matching 
process indicate that the quality of the match should be good. Table A.7 shows that this is in fact 
the case. The distribution of net worth has been fairly well-preserved. Percentile ratios are 
closely carried over. The differences in the ratios between the matched file and the PAT are due 
to the lower half of the distribution in the matched file having larger values than the PAT and 
vice versa for the upper half of the distribution. For example, the p10 value for net worth in the 
matched file is €375, as opposed to €354 in the PAT file, while the p90 is €348,645 and 
€349,089 in the match file and the Pat, respectively. The Gini coefficients are, nonetheless, 
almost identical.  
                                                           
41 Variables with missing values were occupational category, dwelling type and nearly all of the financial variables.   71
Figure A.3 shows the ratio of mean net worth in the matched file to the PAT by strata 
variable categories. As we can see, net worth has been fairly well reproduced in the match file, 
with generally small variations between the matched file and the PAT. In most cases the 
differences are within 5%. Exceptions include male-headed households, with 7.2% lower net 
worth in the matched file, elders with 7% greater net worth, renters with 9.7% greater net worth 
in the matched file, and household heads with less than a baccalaureate, with 5.8% greater net 
worth. The greatest differences are by household income category. Households with between 
€10,000 and €20,000 in household income per year have 7.4% lower net worth in the matched 
file, while those with between €30,000 and €60,000 and greater than €60,000 in household 
income per year have 10.3% and 17.8% greater net worth in the matched file, respectively. 
These relatively large differences are due to the misalignment in household income categories 
between the two files noted above. 
The comparison of mean and median net worth by strata variable categories is found in 
Table A.8. The ratios of mean net worth by category are very similar between the PAT and the 
matched file. The most notable difference is the ratio between non-elder and elder mean 
household net worth. While the means in the matched file differ considerably from the PAT, the 
relative position of the non-elders vis-à-vis elders is preserved. The matched file to PAT ratios 
in median values are somewhat more concerning. Non-elders have 13% lower median net worth 
in the matched file (a €8,400 difference), while households between €10,000 and €20,000 in 
household income per year have 27% lower median net worth (€8,800). However, the ratios of 
non-elder to elder median net worth are close enough and the ratios of the individual income 
categories to the highest category are well reproduced in the matched file. 
Finally, Figure A.4 shows the distribution of log net worth within collapsed matching 
cells (by family type, homeownership, and age). The distributions have been carried over very 
well. The most obvious difference is that the lower tails of the distributions haven’t been carried 
over completely in some of the larger cells (for example, non-elder renter married couples). The 
bulk of the distribution is quite well carried over, however. 
Overall, the match has provided us with a fair representation of the original distribution 
of wealth in the PAT. The differences we observe are small enough not to affect the outcome of 
the final analysis of the LIMEW greatly.     72
A.3 Tables  
Table A.1: Alignment of Strata Variables for 1989 Wealth Match 
 
BDF 1989 EAF 1992 Diff (%)
Households 21,201,890   22,145,485   4.45%
<50,000F 16.35% 15.17% -1.18%
50,000-75,000 F 13.24% 16.99% 3.75%
75,000-100,000 F 12.93% 15.86% 2.93%
100,000-130,000 F 15.06% 16.53% 1.47%
130,000-200,000 F 24.21% 20.63% -3.58%
>= 200,000 F 18.21% 14.81% -3.40%
Renter 44.52% 45.57% 1.05%
Owner 55.48% 54.43% -1.05%
Married Couple 65.54% 65.74% 0.20%
Female Head 23.71% 22.98% -0.73%
Male Head 10.74% 11.28% 0.54%
Nonelder 75.41% 73.64% -1.77%
Elder 24.59% 26.36% 1.77%
Less than 35 22.50% 20.34% -2.16%
35 to 44 21.08% 21.44% 0.36%
45 to 54 15.22% 16.35% 1.13%
55 to 64 16.61% 15.51% -1.10%
65 and older 24.59% 26.36% 1.77%
Less than BAC 26.54% 24.09% -2.45%
BAC 59.73% 61.69% 1.96%
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Table A.2: Distribution of Matched Records by Matching Round, 1989 Wealth Match 
 








1 17,739,636 83.7 83.7
2 477,146 2.3 85.9
3 268400 1.3 87.2
4 321913 1.5 88.7
5 624,181 2.9 91.6
6 128956 0.6 92.2
7 78142 0.4 92.6
8 61835 0.3 92.9
9 234760 1.1 94.0
10 12051 0.1 94.1
11 648176 3.1 97.1
12 3982 0.0 97.2
13 62,811 0.3 97.5
14 51,217 0.24 97.7
15 11,124 0.05 97.7
16 82,827 0.39 98.1
17 4,356 0.02 98.2
18 10,184 0.05 98.2
19 4,140 0.02 98.2
20 19,976 0.09 98.3
21 3,947 0.02 98.3
22 356,077 1.68 100.0
Total 21,205,837 100.0
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 p75/p25 p75/p50 p50/p25 Gini
Match 4979.45 4.88 1021.31 25.97 2.56 10.16 0.681
EAF 1108.89 4.83 229.60 22.40 2.53 8.87 0.677  74




Asset1 338,982 336,387 99.23%
Asset2 169,960 165,774 97.54%
Asset3 103,525 101,147 97.70%
Asset4 21,646 21,090 97.43%
Asset5 14,489 14,108 97.37%
Debt1 49,860 48,446 97.16%
Debt2 8,326 8,399 100.88%
Networth 590,417 581,660 98.52%
EAF1992 Match
renter 160,263 159,278 99.39% ren/own 0.169 0.173
homeowner 950,537 920,567 96.85%
non-elder 561,165 565,304 100.74% non/eld 0.835 0.895
elder 672,142 631,813 94.00%
MC 706,390      694,513    98.32%
FH 362,526      363,688    100.32% fh/mc 0.513 0.524
MH 378,856      374,287    98.79% mh/mc 0.536 0.539
LT BAC 348,102      373,980    107.43% ltBAC/gtBAC 0.335 0.375
BAC 581,608      578,480    99.46% BAC/gtBAC 0.560 0.580
GT BAC 1,038,878   997,030    95.97%
Less than 50K 235,667 256,977 109.04% lt 50k 0.156 0.197
50K to 75K 297,237 323,337 108.78% 50-75k 0.197 0.248
75K to 100K 395,661 383,635 96.96% 75-100k 0.262 0.294
100K to 130K 521,959 442,518 84.78% 100-130k 0.345 0.340
130K to 200K 636,620 592,127 93.01% 130-200k 0.421 0.454




Asset1 175,000 175,000 100.00%
Asset2 0 0





Networth 299,392 291,074 97.22%
EAF1992 Match
renter 30,936 30,660 99.11% ren/own 0.049 0.050
homeowner 633,302 612,812 96.76%
non-elder 262,321 271,824 103.62% non/eld 0.646 0.740
elder 405,827 367,279 90.50%
MC 413,935    407,236    98.38%
FH 112,214    106,244    94.68% fh/mc 0.271 0.261
MH 121,317    132,088    108.88% mh/mc 0.293 0.324
LT BAC 139,508    150,893    108.16% ltBAC/gtBAC 0.288 0.406
BAC 350,718    358,847    102.32% BAC/gtBAC 0.724 0.966
GT BAC 484,654    371,615    76.68%
Less than 50K 44,009 44,640 101.43% lt 50k 0.046 0.057
50K to 75K 109,691 140,000 127.63% 50-75k 0.114 0.179
75K to 100K 223,971 205,644 91.82% 75-100k 0.233 0.262
100K to 130K 348,414 285,243 81.87% 100-130k 0.363 0.364
130K to 200K 444,889 403,634 90.73% 130-200k 0.464 0.515
200K or more 959,759 783,938 81.68%  76
Table A.5: Alignment of Strata Variables for 2000 Wealth Match 
 
BDF 2001 PAT 2004 Diff (%)
Households 24,525,505 24,737,820 0.87%
Less than 10K 10.58% 16.41% 5.83%
10K to 20K 30.54% 30.84% 0.30%
20K to 30K 25.64% 22.47% -3.17%
30K to 60K 27.87% 20.03% -7.84%
60K or more 5.37% 10.25% 4.88%
Renter 45.19% 44.28% -0.91%
Owner 54.81% 55.72% 0.91%
Married Couple 63.41% 61.55% -1.86%
Female Head 24.29% 24.85% 0.56%
Male Head 12.30% 13.60% 1.30%
Nonelder 74.12% 73.11% -1.01%
Elder 25.88% 26.89% 1.01%
Less than 35 19.95% 19.13% -0.82%
35 to 44 20.35% 19.65% -0.70%
45 to 54 20.11% 19.53% -0.58%
55 to 64 13.71% 14.81% 1.10%
65 and older 25.88% 26.89% 1.01%
Less than BAC 21.09% 20.82% -0.27%
BAC 69.88% 70.17% 0.29%






Family Type  77
Table A.6: Distribution of Matched Records by Matching Round, 2000 Wealth Match 
 














1 20,775,605 84.7 84.7
2 305,639 1.3 86.0
3 157,082 0.6 86.6
4 150,318 0.6 87.2
5 2,012,298 8.2 95.4
6 2,020 0.0 95.4
7 80,449 0.3 95.8
8 291,313 1.2 96.9
9 123,398 0.5 97.4
10 136,370 0.6 98.0
11 33,933 0.1 98.1
12 26,201 0.1 98.2
13 10,617 0.0 98.3
14 116,646 0.5 98.8
15 40,731 0.2 98.9
16 14,570 0.1 99.0
17 44,778 0.2 99.2
18 20,072 0.1 99.3
19 21,901 0.1 99.3
20 161,564 0.7 100.0
Total 24,525,505 100.0
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 p75/p25 p75/p50 p50/p25 Gini
Match 929.72 4.63 200.87 28.32 2.42 11.71 0.6786
PAT 986.13 4.56 216.45 29.12 2.40 12.14 0.6788  78




Asset1 78,008 76,899 98.58%
Asset2 47,240 46,840 99.15%
Asset3 13,615 13,456 98.83%
Asset4 23,937 23,657 98.83%
Debt1 9,693 8,729 90.05%
Debt2 1,536 1,531 99.67%
Networth 151,570 150,592 99.35%
PAT2004 Match
renter 37,265 40,886 109.72% ren/own 0.154 0.170
homeowner 242,418 241,059 99.44%
non-elder 147,887 142,819 96.57% non/eld 0.915 0.826
elder 161,583 172,854 106.98%
MC 193,378    189,387    97.94%
FH 81,190      82,815      102.00% fh/mc 0.420 0.437
MH 90,944      84,426      92.83% mh/mc 0.470 0.446
LT BAC 88,565      93,699      105.80% ltBAC/gtBAC 0.522 0.533
BAC 167,921    164,502    97.96% BAC/gtBAC 0.989 0.936
GT BAC 169,789    175,842    103.57%
Less than 10K 52,678 52,720 100.08% lt 10k 0.104 0.089
10K to 20K 79,192 73,352 92.63% 10-20k 0.157 0.123
20K to 30K 117,851 113,046 95.92% 20-30k 0.233 0.190
30K to 60K 200,613 221,258 110.29% 30-60k 0.397 0.371




Asset1 37,984 32,471 85.49%
Asset2 0 0
Asset3 4,815 4,890 101.56%
Asset4 1,888 1,962 103.92%
Debt1 0 0
Debt2 0 0
Networth 76,623 75,327 98.31%
PAT2004 Match
renter 4,612 5,140 111.45% ren/own 0.030 0.033
homeowner 155,229 155,244 100.01%
non-elder 66,642 58,228 87.37% non/eld 0.649 0.514
elder 102,677 113,385 110.43%
MC 114,906    109,644    95.42%
FH 23,547      26,378      112.02% fh/mc 0.205 0.241
MH 20,084      19,381      96.50% mh/mc 0.175 0.177
LT BAC 33,825      47,569      140.63% ltBAC/gtBAC 0.380 0.511
BAC 88,071      82,880      94.11% BAC/gtBAC 0.988 0.890
GT BAC 89,108      93,111      104.49%
Less than 10K 6,485 5,778 89.10% lt 10k 0.022 0.018
10K to 20K 31,974 23,197 72.55% 10-20k 0.108 0.074
20K to 30K 82,774 73,195 88.43% 20-30k 0.280 0.234
30K to 60K 141,141 147,248 104.33% 30-60k 0.477 0.471
60K or more 295,876 312,454 105.60% 60k or more 1.000 1.000 
A.4 Figures  
Figure A.1: Ratio of Mean Net Worth by Category (Match/
Figure A.2: Net Worth by Matching Cells, 199
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APPENDIX B: STATISTICAL MATCHES WITH TIME USE DATA 
B.1 1989 
Data and Alignment 
The source data sets for the time use match for the 1989 LIMEW estimates are the 1989-90 
BDF and the 1998 EDT. We use individual records from the 1989-90 BDF file, excluding those 
living in group quarters or in the Armed Forces. Since the EDT covers individuals 15 years old 
and above, we discard younger individuals from the BDF file. This leaves 19,293 records, 
which represents 43,496,343 individuals when weighted. The EDT file includes time use data 
for 16,047 individuals, representing 43,183,035 individuals when weighted.  
For the time use match, the strata variables are sex, parental status, employment status, 
marital status, and spouse’s employment status. While for the wealth match the matching unit is 
the household, for the time use match we use individuals. Table B.1 compares the distribution of 
individuals by these variables in the two data sets. We see that the distribution of individuals by 
sex is very closely aligned in the two surveys. The next closest match is by labor force status, 
with more employed persons in the EDT. Parental status is also well-aligned. However, the 
portion of married individuals is much higher in the BDF. Spouse’s labor force status, on the 
other hand, is relatively close (among those with spouses). Clearly marital status is the most 
troubling in terms of alignment and we can expect there to be some discrepancy between the 
matched file and the EDT in this variable. 
Match QC 
Turning to the results of the match, we first look to the distribution of matched records by 
matching round in Table B.2. The bulk of the matches, 92%, occur in the first round, ensuring 
as high-quality a match as possible. Table B.3 provides a closer comparison of the distribution 
of weekly hours of household production in the EDT and the matched file. The percentile ratios 
are almost all equivalent. P75 is slightly off between the matched file (35.93 hours) and the 
EDT (35.58 hours), a very small difference. The Gini coefficient is extremely close, 0.4875 in 
the matched file, compared to 0.4866 in the EDT.  
Examination of the quality of the match within population sub-groups shows generally 
good results. Figure B.1 displays ratios of mean weekly hours of household production between 
the matched file and the EDT for the five strata variables. When not equal, the ratios of mean 
weekly hours of household production within sub-categories of the strata variables are all within   83
5% of unity. Unmarried individuals and those individuals whose spouse is not working have 
weekly hours that are 5% lower and higher, respectively, in the matched file than in the EDT.  
Table B.4 has the actual numbers, and we can see that these differences amount to one 
hour a week in each case. However, notice that the median weekly hours of household 
production for unmarried individuals in the matched file is two hours lower than that of the 
EDT, for a difference of 13%. The median weekly hours for those not working is one hour 
lower in the matched file, a difference of 4%. All other means and medians in the matched file 
perfectly mirror the EDT. The extent to which the match file reproduces the distribution of 
weekly hours of household production within collapsed matching cells is demonstrated in 
Figure B.2.
42 We can see very little difference between the matched file and the EDT. Thus the 
distribution of household production is well preserved in the matching process, even at this level 
of detail. 
Overall, the quality of the match is very good. The overall distribution is transferred with 
remarkable accuracy, and the distributions within sub-groups, such as female non-parent 
employees, are transferred with good precision. Even in the case of marital status, the transfer of 
weekly hours of household production is quite precise. 
 
B.2 2000 
Data and Alignment 
The source data sets for the time use match for the 2000 LIMEW estimates are the 2000 BDF 
and the 1999 EDT. We use individual records from the 2000 BDF file, excluding those living in 
group quarters or in the Armed Forces. Since the EDT covers individuals 15 years old and 
above, we discard younger individuals from the BDF file. This leaves 103,320 records, which 
represents 47,659,195 individuals when weighted. The EDT file includes time use data for 
15,466 individuals, corresponding to 47,302,220 individuals when weighted. Due to missing 
values,
43 we used multiple imputation with chained equations on the 1999 EDT. For the time 
use match, the strata variables are sex, parental status, employment status, marital status, and 
spouse’s employment status. While for the wealth match the matching unit is the household, for 
the time use match we use individuals.  
                                                           
42  Marital status and spouse’s employment status are excluded for the sake of clarity of the plot. 
43 The one variable with missing values was household income.   84
Table B.5 compares the distribution of individuals by these variables in the two data 
sets. Since the two surveys were carried out just one year apart, we can expect them to be well-
aligned. We see that the distribution of individuals by sex is only slightly different in the two 
surveys. Parents are much less prevalent in the BDF than in the EDT (by 7.5%). The employed 
are slightly under-represented by 2.1%, in the EDT relative to the BDF. The portion of married 
individuals is lower in the EDT, by 1.8%. The difference in spouse’s labor force status is quite 
small (0.4%). The difference in parental status, possibly reflecting different sampling frames, is 
the greatest cause for concern in terms of the potential match quality, but the alignment overall 
is good. 
Match QC 
Table B.6 shows the distribution of matched records by matching round. The fact that only 
seven rounds were required to complete the match is a promising sign for the quality of the 
match. Indeed, 90.8 percent of records were matched in the first round of matching. The overall 
distribution of weekly hours of household production in the matched file is very close to that in 
the EDT, based on the percentile ratios and Gini coefficients displayed in Table B.7. Only the 
p90/p50 ratio is off, by very little. The Gini coefficient is off by only 0.01 Gini points. Figure 
B.3 displays ratios of mean weekly hours of household production by the strata variables, as 
well as household income and education. In terms of the strata variables, the match looks very 
good for each one. With one exception the matched file exactly reproduces the EDT. Non-
parents have 6% greater average weekly hours of household production in the match file. In 
terms of household income and education, the differences are greater, but still mostly within 
10%. The lowest household income category is the farthest off, 18% lower in the matched file 
than in the EDT, while the highest income category and those with greater than baccalaureates 
had 13% and 12% greater weekly hours of household production, respectively, in the matched 
file than in the EDT. 
Table B.8 gives us a closer look at the numbers behind Figure B.3, showing the mean 
and median weekly hours of household production by the strata variables, plus education and 
household income. Here we can see that the 6% difference in mean weekly hours for non-
parents translates to one hour per week, as do the differences by education and income for the 
most part. The exceptions are for those households with less than €10,000 (four hours less) and 
more than €50,000 and greater than baccalaureate (two hours more). The ratios by strata 
variables are correspondingly well reproduced in the matched file. As we can see, the ratios of   85
matched to EDT medians are unity for all the strata variable categories except non-parents. For 
the latter the difference is 7%, but still only a one hour difference. The differences for non-strata 
variables are again larger, with those with less than a baccalaureate registering two hours less 
per week and those with greater than a baccalaureate one more at the median in the matched 
file, while those in households with less than €10,000 incomes have six fewer, those in 
households with €10,000 to €20,000 two fewer, and those with €20,000 to €30,000 and greater 
than €50,000 two more hours of household production. The ratios of household income 
categories to the highest category are thus not well-retained in the matched file. 
Finally, Figure B.4 displays the distributions of household production weekly hours in 
collapsed matching cells (by sex, parent and employment status). There are few noticeable 
differences between the EDT and the matched file, indicating that even within cells, there has 
been good transference of the distributions of household production. In many of the cells the 
upper tail has not been well-transferred. 
In summary the reproduction of the weekly hours of household production in the EDT in 
the matched file is very good. The remaining differences are small, and do not greatly impact 
the final LIMEW estimates for France.  86
B.3 Tables 
Table B.1: Alignment of Strata Variables for 1989 Time Use Match 
 
Table B.2: Distribution of Matched Records by Matching Round, 1989 Time Use Match 
 




BDF1989 EDT1985 Diff (%)
Individuals 43,511,114 43,183,035 -0.75%
Female 52.58% 52.15% -0.43%
Male 47.42% 47.85% 0.43%
No 72.43% 71.61% -0.82%
Yes 27.57% 28.39% 0.82%
Not employed 50.89% 50.36% -0.53%
Employed 49.11% 49.64% 0.53%
No 36.58% 44.43% 7.85%
Yes 63.42% 55.57% -7.85%
Spouse not employed 41.19% 40.35% -0.84%












1 40,060,981 92.2 92.2
2 19,518 0.0 92.2
3 2821934 6.5 98.7
4 113,828 0.3 99.0
5 116,908 0.3 99.3
6 229801 0.5 99.8
7 53704 0.1 99.9
8 37472 0.1 100.0
Total 43,454,146 100.0
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 p75/p25 p75/p50 p50/p25 Gini
EDT 17.600 2.667 6.600 4.692 1.848 2.538 0.4866
IMP 17.600 2.667 6.600 4.738 1.867 2.538 0.4875  87





Mean Values of Household Production
EdT85 Match Ratio
Care 16.0 16.0 100.0%
Procurement 2.8 2.8 100.0%
Core 2.9 2.9 100.0%
Total 22.0 22.0 100.0%
EdT85 Match
Female 32.0 32.0 100.0% F/M 2.909 2.909
Male 11.0 11.0 100.0%
Unmarried 19.0 18.0 94.7% S/M 0.826 0.750
Married 23.0 24.0 104.3%
Non-parent 20.0 20.0 100.0% NP/P 0.741 0.741
Parent 27.0 27.0 100.0%
Not Working 27.0 27.0 100.0% NW/W 1.588 1.588
Working 17.0 17.0 100.0%
No Spouse 19.0 18.0 94.7% NoSp/SpW 0.950 0.857
Spouse Not Working 20.0 21.0 105.0% NoSp/SpNW 0.731 0.692
Spouse Working 26.0 26.0 100.0%
Median Values of Household Production
EdT85 Match Ratio
Care 11.0 11.0 100.0%
Procurement 0.6 0.6 100.0%
Core 0.0 0.0
Total 17.0 17.0 100.0%
EdT85 Match
Female 30.0 30.0 100.0% F/M 4.286 4.286
Male 7.0 7.0 100.0%
Unmarried 15.0 13.0 86.7% S/M 0.833 0.684
Married 18.0 19.0 105.6%
Non-parent 15.0 15.0 100.0% NP/P 0.682 0.682
Parent 22.0 22.0 100.0%
Not Working 24.0 23.0 95.8% NW/W 2.000 1.917
Working 12.0 12.0 100.0%
No Spouse 15.0 13.0 86.7% NoSp/SpW 1.000 0.867
Spouse Not Working 15.0 15.0 100.0% NoSp/SpNW 0.714 0.619
Spouse Working 21.0 21.0 100.0%  88
Table B.5: Alignment of Strata Variables for 2000 Time Use Match 
 
Table B.6: Distribution of Matched Records by Matching Round, 2000 Time Use Match 
 
 
Table B.7: Distribution of Weekly Hours of Household Production in 1999 EDT 
and Matched File 
 
 
   
BDF 2001 EdT 1999 diff (%)
Individuals 47,659,195 47,302,220 -0.75%
Female 52.29% 51.90% -0.39%
Male 47.71% 48.10% 0.39%
No 69.23% 61.73% -7.50%
Yes 30.77% 38.27% 7.50%
Not employed 50.10% 52.23% 2.13%
Employed 49.90% 47.77% -2.13%
No 36.04% 37.89% 1.85%
Yes 63.96% 62.11% -1.85%
Spouse not employed 43.04% 42.63% -0.41%












1 43,273,229     90.8 90.8
2 808,810         1.7 92.5
3 2,504,740       5.3 97.8
4 52,069           0.1 97.9
5 705,783         1.5 99.4
6 233,510         0.5 99.9
7 67,233           0.1 100.0
Total 47,645,374     100.0
p90/p10 p90/p50 p50/p10 p75/p25 p75/p50 p50/p25 Gini
EDT1999          . 3.08          . 8.67 2.00 4.33 0.5084
MATCH          . 3.00          . 8.67 2.00 4.33 0.5085  89




Mean Values of Household Production
EDT1999 Match Ratio
Care 14.0 14.0 100.0%
Procurement 3.6 3.6 100.0%
Core 2.2 2.2 100.0%
Total 20.0 20.0 100.0%
EDT1999 Match
Not married 15.0 15.0 100.0% S/M 0.682 0.682
Married 22.0 22.0 100.0%
Non-parent 17.0 18.0 105.9% NP/P 0.708 0.750
Parent 24.0 24.0 100.0%
Female 28.0 28.0 100.0% F/M 2.545 2.545
Male 11.0 11.0 100.0%
Not Working 23.0 23.0 100.0% NW/W 1.438 1.438
Working 16.0 16.0 100.0%
No Spouse 15.0 15.0 100.0% NoSp/SpW 0.714 0.714
Not Working 21.0 21.0 100.0% NoSp/SpNW 0.652 0.652
Working 23.0 23.0 100.0%
LT BAC 21.0 20.0 95.2% LT BAC/GTB 1.235 1.053
BAC 20.0 19.0 95.0% BAC/GTB 1.176 1.000
GT BAC 17.0 19.0 111.8%
      <€10,000 22.0 18.0 81.8% lt€10k/ge€50k 1.375 1.000
€10,000-19,999 21.0 20.0 95.2% €10-20k/ge€50k 1.313 1.111
€20,000-29,999 20.0 20.0 100.0% €20-30k/ge€50k 1.250 1.111
€30,000-49,999 18.0 19.0 105.6% €30-50k/ge€50k 1.125 1.056
     >=€50,000 16.0 18.0 112.5%  90
 
Median Values of Household Production
EDT1999 Match Ratio
Care 9.3 9.3 100.0%
Procurement 0.0 0.0
Core 0.0 0.0
Total 15.0 15.0 100.0%
EDT1999 Match
Not married 11.0 11.0 100.0% S/M 0.611 0.611
Married 18.0 18.0 100.0%
Non-parent 13.0 14.0 107.7% NP/P 0.650 0.700
Parent 20.0 20.0 100.0%
Female 26.0 26.0 100.0% F/M 3.714 3.714
Male 7.0 7.0 100.0%
Not Working 20.0 20.0 100.0% NW/W 1.667 1.667
Working 12.0 12.0 100.0%
No Spouse 11.0 11.0 100.0% NoSp/SpW 0.611 0.611
Not Working 18.0 18.0 100.0% NoSp/SpNW 0.611 0.611
Working 18.0 18.0 100.0%
LT BAC 18.0 16.0 88.9% LT BAC/GTB 1.385 1.143
BAC 15.0 15.0 100.0% BAC/GTB 1.154 1.071
GT BAC 13.0 14.0 107.7%
      <€10,000 20.0 14.0 70.0% lt€10k/ge€50k 1.250 0.778
€10,000-19,999 18.0 16.0 88.9% €10-20k/ge€50k 1.125 0.889
€20,000-29,999 14.0 16.0 114.3% €20-30k/ge€50k 0.875 0.889
€30,000-49,999 14.0 14.0 100.0% €30-50k/ge€50k 0.875 0.778
     >=€50,000 11.0 13.0 118.2% 
B.4 Figures 
Figure B.1: Ratio of Mean HH Production by Category (Match/
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Ratio of Mean HH Production by Category (Match/EDT 198 85) 
  
Figure B.2: Household Production by Matching Cells, 19
Figure B.3: Ratio of Mean HH Production by Category (Match/
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Household Production by Matching Cells, 1985 EDT
Ratio of Mean HH Production by Category (Match/EDT 1999




Figure B.4: Household Production by Matching Cells, 
93
Household Production by Matching Cells, 1999 EDT and Matched File and Matched File 
 